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Algorithmic Speech and Freedom
of Expression
Alan

. Sears'

ABSTRACT

Algorithms have become increasingly common, and with this
development, so have algorithms that approximatehuman speech. This
has introduced new issues with which courts and legislators will have
to grapple. Courts in the United States have found that search engine

results are a form of speech that is protected by the Constitution, and
cases in Europe concerning liabilityfor autocomplete suggestions have
led to varied results. Beyond these instances, insight into how courts

handle algorithmicspeech are few and far between.
By focusing on three categories of algorithmic speech, defined as
curated production, interactive/responsive production, and semiautonomous production, this Article analyzes these various forms of

algorithmic speech within the internationalframework for freedom of
expression. After a brief introduction of that framework and a look
towards approaches to algorithmic speech in the United States, the
Article then examines whether the creators or controllers of different

forms of algorithms should be considered content providers or mere
intermediaries, the determinationof which ultimately has implications

for liability, which is also explored. The Article then looks at possible
interferences with algorithmicspeech, and how such interferences may
be examined under the three-part test-particularattention is paid to
the balancing of rights and interests at play-in order to answer the
question of the extent to which algorithmicspeech is worthy of protection
under international standardsof freedom of expression. Finally, other
relevant issues surroundingalgorithmicspeech are discussed that will

have an impact going forward, many of which involve questions of
policy and societal values that accompany grantingalgorithmic speech
protection.

* Researcher and Lecturer at eLaw, Center for Law and Digital Technologies,
Faculty of Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands. LL.M., Leiden Law School (2017);
J.D., Notre Dame Law School (2014); B.A., Baylor University (2006). The author would
like to thank Professor Jan Oster for his insightful comments on earlier drafts. Contact:

a.m.sears@law.leidenuniv.nl
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INTRODUCTION

A. Background
Algorithms have become ubiquitous in our modern, technology-

driven society. They are used in Global Position Systems (GPS), as well
as in many different aspects of mobile phones and personal computers.
Algorithms also assist planes in flying and cars in drivingparticularly those of the self-driving variety. Despite the fact that
algorithms have become a part of daily life in many ways, their
operation is usually behind the scenes, and their usage goes unnoticed.
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An increasing number of algorithms work to produce outputs that

may be considered speech, such as automatically generated news
stories, search results and their autocomplete function, as well as chat
bots, such as Amazon's Alexa, Apple's Siri, Google's Assistant, and
Microsoft's Cortana. There is also an untold number of bots operating
on Twitter,1

some

of which Twitter has begun to prune more

aggressively because of disinformation campaigns. 2 However, few are
as infamous as Microsoft's Tay Artificial Intelligence, which was
designed to mimic the speech patterns of a 19-year-old American girl. 3
Within a day of its release, it was taught by users to make racist
tweets; in this short time, the bot went from saying "Humans are super
cool!" to "Hitlerwas right."4 These outputs were obviously not intended
by the programmers.

The issues surrounding such algorithmically generated speech
will only increase in importance as algorithms are developed to create
more "intelligent" and complex speech, 5 which may include unforeseen

utterances. While we may not have quite reached the age where it is
necessary to question whether robots should be afforded rights, we
have arrived at the time when it is necessary to examine the extent to
which the developers or controllers of algorithms that produce speech
are protected by the right to freedom of expression. 6
This Article aims to provide an analysis of algorithmic speech
within the context of the international framework for freedom of

1.
Onur Varol, Emilio Ferrara, Clayton Davis, Filippo Menczer & Alessandro
Flammini, Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, and Characterization,
INT'L CONF. WEBLOGS & Soc. MEDIA (Mar. 27, 2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.03107
[https://perma.cc/2Q3G-9G79] (archived Aug. 18, 2020) (estimating that between 9% and
15% of active Twitter accounts are actually bots).
2.
Andy Greenberg, Twitter Still Can't Keep Up With Its Flood of Junk Accounts,
Study Finds, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/twitter-abusive-appsmachine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/3RJ3-C83T] (archived Aug. 20, 2020); Craig
Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter is Sweeping Out Fake Accounts Like Never Before,
Putting
User
Growth
at
Risk,
WASH.
POST
(July
7,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/06/twitter-is-sweeping-out-fakeaccounts-like-never-before-putting-user-growth-risk/
[https://perma.cc/MA7S-KRVW]
(archived Aug. 20, 2020).
3. Davey Alba, It's Your Fault Microsoft's Teen AI Turned Into Such a Jerk,
WIRED (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/fault-microsofts-teen-ai-turnedjerk/ [https://perma.cc/EZ33-CLLB] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
4.
John West, Microsoft's Disastrous Tay Experiment Shows the Hidden Dangers
of Al, QUARTZ (Apr. 2, 2016), https://qz.com/653084/microsofts-disastrous-tayexperiment-shows-the-hidden-dangers-of-ai/
[https://perma.cc/F3JC-EHV4] (archived
Aug. 20, 2020).
5.
Steps have been taken in this direction. See Ronald Ashri, Just how big a deal
is Google's New Meena Chatbot Model?, VENTUREBEAT (Feb. 1, 2020),

https://venturebeat.com/2020/02/01/just-how-big-a-deal-is-googles-new-meena-chatbot-

model! [https://perma.cc/HXB8-29FF] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
6.
Throughout this article, I will often refer to the controllers of algorithms. This
is relevant because an algorithm may not always be used by only its developer; it may in
fact be licensed to other parties for use.
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expression. Previous literature has largely focused on certain forms of
algorithmic speech, particularly search engine results and a search
engine's autocomplete function. The former has been the subject of

multiple cases in the United States, and thus the focus has primarily
been on where such speech lies within the First Amendment doctrine-

and thus the extent to which it is protected by the Constitution. The
latter has been scrutinized by various national courts across Europe.
Thus, there is an apparent gap in having a more comprehensive
international approach to algorithmic speech, and hence the primary
research question this Article addresses is the extent to which
algorithmic speech is protected under international standards of
freedom of expression.

Further issues arise as well: whether algorithmically generated
content should be considered speech, whether the controllers of
algorithms are content providers or intermediaries, when might

liability be imposed for infringing algorithmic speech, the extent to
which algorithmically generated content is afforded freedom of
expression protection, under what circumstances would interferences
be justified, and the implications of having the freedom of expression
framework apply to algorithmically generated speech.
As this Article aims to address all of these issues within the
current international framework for freedom of expression,

international legislation and case law-particularly from the
European and Inter-American systems-will be referenced where
relevant. National case law and legislation will also be examined for
purposes of comparisons and distinctions, and to provide further
guidance as many of these issues have yet to be examined by
international courts. Academic literature, as well as practical and

sociological aspects relating to algorithmic speech, will be analyzed and
incorporated in various areas. Recommendations will be made where

it is apparent that the framework is ill-equipped to adequately deal
with these issues.
It should be noted that there are a number of ways that algorithms
interact with freedom of expression, which abut the topic presented in

this Article, that may also be cause for concern. For instance, the use
of algorithms in how news and information is presented to users may
have an impact on the right to receive information, in that they can
7
result in "echo chambers" or "filter bubbles." While aspects such as
these are no doubt worthy of investigation, they are outside the scope
of this Article.

After defining algorithmic speech and introducing the variants
that will form the basis of this Article, Part II will discuss algorithmic

COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMM. OF EXPERTS ON INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES,
7.
ALGORITHMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: STUDY ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF
AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING TECHNIQUES AND POSSIBLE REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS

17 (2018).
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speech and the scope of internationally recognized freedom of
expression standards, as well as where algorithmic speech fits within
this framework. Part III will analyze the extent to which algorithmic
speech is worthy of protection under these standards.

B. What is Algorithmic Speech?
As seen above, algorithms can perform a multitude of functions in
a wide range of industries and have been defined in a variety of ways
over time. 8 In this Article, the usage of the term "algorithm" will be "a
set of instructions designed to produce an output."9 Further, as
algorithms may exist outside of the computer-centric world we live in
today, usage will only encompass the common understanding of the

term, in that it will refer to the algorithms that are implemented by
computers.10
One may assume that if the definition of an algorithm is
unsettled," then there is likewise no single accepted definition of what

constitutes algorithmic speech. Indeed, this is a vague and imprecise
categorization.
In some instances, the speech or expression of algorithms is quite

apparent, especially when it mimics what a person would do. This is
the case with chat bots such as those that provide technical support or
Microsoft's Zo (the successor to Tay),1 2 or algorithms that are fed data
in order to piece together news stories.

At the opposite end of the spectrum are algorithms that are clearly
not speech, such as those that perform operations in programs with no
visible output. An example of this would be the algorithms on a mobile
phone that determine which Wi-Fi access point to connect to when
there are multiple available.' 3

8.
Algorithm
Characterizations,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithmcharacterizations (last visited May 10, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/Y4EC-X6HE] (archived Aug, 20, 2020) [hereinafter Algorithm
Characterizations].
9.
Stuart M. Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447 n.4
(2013). Among the many definitions that I have read, Benjamin's is among the most
concise and easy to understand, particularly for those who may not have a good
understanding of technical subjects such as these. See id.

10. See id.
11. See Algorithm Characterizations, supra note 8.
12. Let's Talk about Zo, MICROSoFT, https://www.zo.ail (last visited Feb. 29, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/K5KN-H7EY] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
13.
See Dongsu Han, David G. Andersen, Michael Kaminsky, Konstantina
Papagiannaki & Srinivaan Seshan, Access Point Localization Using Local Signal
Strength Gradient, in PASSIVE AND ACTIVE NETWORK MEASUREMENT, 5448 LNCS 99

(2009); see also Kirn Gill, Does Your Phone Use Algorithms to Decide Which Cell Tower
It Should Connect To?, QUORA (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.quora.com/Does-your-phoneuse-algorithms-to-decide-which-cell-tower-it-should-connect-to
[https://perma.cc/8A5SFG76] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
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Lying somewhere in between these two extremes are algorithms

that could feasibly be considered speech, such as a search engine
autocomplete function1 4 or the search engine results themselves. The
15
former has been the subject of court cases in Europe, and the latter
has been the subject of court cases and academic debate in the United
States. 16
Regarding the autocomplete function, courts in France have held

that it does not constitute speech. In one case, a narrow interpretation
of the Convention was used to find that freedom of expression is a right
that only applies to "persons," and thus it cannot be invoked in order

to protect the output of an algorithm.1 7 In another case, it was found
that an autocomplete function's word associations are only a technical
8
method to facilitate a search and are not expressions of opinion.'

However, the German Federal Court of Justice-the court of last
resort-found that word associations, such as those resulting from an
9
autocomplete suggestion, impart meaning.'

In the United States, courts have generally held that search
engine results constitute speech, 20 even though search engine results
merely present content provided by others. Academics have argued
that algorithms are speech in that "algorithms themselves inherently
incorporate the search engine company engineers' judgments about

what material users are most likely to find responsive to their
queries."2 1 Others have contended that this algorithmic output does
not constitute speech due to it containing a low degree of

14. The autocomplete function I'm referring to here is utilized on Google's search
engine, among others. Once you start typing in a search string, the search engine will
present a list of predictions or suggestions so as to complete what you are searching for
to save you time and/or to give you new ideas.
15. For further analysis on this point, see Part II.B.2.a.
16. For further analysis on this point, see Part II.A.2.
17. See M. X./Google Inc., Eric S. et Google France, Tribunal de grande instance
[TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction], Paris, Sept. 8, 2010 (Fr.) (decision reversed
by the Court of Appeal, Dec. 14, 2011). The Court of Cassation confirmed the appeal
decision on 19 February 2013. In addition to the fact that the case was overturned, it
should be noted that the reading of this court is quite narrow: it ignored the fact that the
right to receive information as part of freedom of expression. See id.
18. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], le civ., Feb. 19,
2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 19 (Fr.) (Pierre B. v. Google Inc,); Cour de Cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., 19 June 2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 625 (Fr.)
(Google v. Lyonnaise de garantie).
19. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 14, 2013, VI ZR
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi(Ger.),
269/12
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=64163&pos=0&anz=1
[https://perma.cc/KQW5-2SPP] (archived July 11, 2020).
Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Langdon
20.
v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google
Tech., Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
21. See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google First Amendment Protection for
Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 883, 884 (2012).
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expressiveness, 22 or because it should be classified as a communicative
tool under the First Amendment's functionality doctrine. 2 3

Regardless of the arguments made on both sides of the debate, 24
for present purposes, this Article presumes that a search engine's
autocomplete function as well as a search engine's results are forms of
speech.

Algorithmic speech can take a number of different forms. The
categories suggested below are by no means exclusionary, and there is
certainly overlap between them-they may be more properly
conceptualized as a sliding scale. However, having a conceptual
understanding may aid in analyzing the issues at hand.

Form of Algorithmic
Speech
Curatedproductionthese are fed data

Example(s)
*

internally

*

News stories-more commonly used
in sports news, but expanding to
other areas as well, these algorithms
are fed facts in order to produce

stories that read as though they were
written by a human 25
Search engine results-using
predefined criteria, search engines
use algorithms (and many times

combinations of them) in order to

Interactive/responsive

"

display the most relevant results in
the provider's estimation in response
to an external source of a string of
text provided by the user
Chat bots-many chat programs,

production-these

whether in social media messaging or

respond to data from
external sources

customer support, utilize algorithms
to respond to people, often with the

intent to imitate a person; Microsoft's
Tay could be considered an example
of this, but could also fall into the
following category

22. See generally Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?
Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149
(2008).
23. See generally Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013).
24. See infra notes 43, 44, 45, 116, 118 & 120 and accompanying text.
25.
Matthew Jenkin, Written Out of the Story: The Robots Capable of Making the
News,

GUARDIAN

(July

22,

2016),

https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-

network/2016/jul/22/written-out-of-story-robots-capable-making-the-news
[https://perma.cc/EL4E-ZXRV] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
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Semi-autonomous
production-thesealso
respond to data from
external sources but
have more "freedom" to
produce unexpected
results from what the
programmers intended.

S

Fully autonomous
production-the
scenario in which an

*

S

[VOL. 53:1327

Tay "learned," or rather adapted,
autonomously based upon the input

of users who interacted with it
Search engines' autocomplete
functions-these incorporate the
input of many people who searched
for certain strings of text without
direct oversight from the
programmers of the algorithm

Not currently in existence

algorithm produces

speech fully
independent of human
intervention

or

input

26

As the last of these categories does not currently exist-and is
unlikely to exist for some time-this Article will focus on the
algorithms that would fall within the first three categories above:
curated production, interactive/responsive production, and semiautonomous production.27 This list also does not purport to contain all
forms of algorithmic speech; it merely exemplifies some of the more
well-known forms, around which the discussion will develop. Several
of the specific examples of algorithmic speech given above will be
examined in more detail below within the context of the international
human rights framework.

While this may seem far-fetched, it may not be so far off as once thought. See
26.
Adrienne LaFrance, An Artificial IntelligenceDeveloped Its Own Non-Human Language,
2017),
15,
(June
ATLANTIc
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/artificial-intelligence-developsits-own-non-human-language/530436/ [https://perma.cc/SB8T-RDG7] (archived Aug. 20,
2020); Timothy Revell, Google's Neural Networks Invent Their Own Encryption, NEW
ScIENTIST (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2110522-googlesneural-networks-invent-their-own-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/6HTE-XTTM] (archived
Aug. 20, 2020).
For reasons unrelated to Skynet, we are unlikely to have fully autonomous Al
27.
"out in the wild" in the near future. Ethical and safety standards need to be developed,
and an optimistic prediction for human-level artificial intelligence is the year 2029. See
19, 2014),
Ray Kurzweil, Don't Fear Artificial Intelligence, TIME (Dec.
[https://perma.ccN4FQhttp://time.com/3641921/dont-fear-artificial-intelligence/
DDGM] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
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II. ALGORITHMIC SPEECH AND THE SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION

This Article focuses on algorithmic speech within the context of
the international framework for freedom of expression. After briefly
introducing this framework, court cases and arguments made by
academics within the markedly different framework of the United
States will be examined to provide further context, before returning to
evaluate how different forms of algorithmic speech fit within the
international framework, in regard to attribution and their
classification as content providers or intermediaries, and liability for

harmful speech.
A. Frameworks for Freedom of Expression
1. The International Framework
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has formed
the foundation of many human rights instruments that have followed
in its wake. 28 Freedom of opinion and expression is specifically
guaranteed in this document,2 9 and it has been further enshrined in
international treaties and developed through the case law of
international bodies and regional courts.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),30 the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 3 1 the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 32 and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 3 3 all provide protection for
the right to freedom of expression, albeit with some limitations. This
right is extremely important and has been held to be "a cornerstone of
the survival of a democratic society."3 4 Generally, the right includes

28.

The

Foundation

of

International

Human

Rights

Law,

U.N.,

https://www. un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-

rights-law/index.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2020) [https://perma.c/4ELX-Y3EN]
(archived Aug. 20, 2020). The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man also
served as guiding principles for the American Convention on Human Rights. See id.
29. G.A. Res. 217 (III), art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
31. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR].
32. American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 [hereinafter ACHR].
33. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 11, Dec. 7, 2000,
2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter CFREU].
34. Us6n Ramirez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, 1 47 (Nov. 20, 2009). Here, the

1336

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:1327

the ability to "receive and impart information and ideas" through any
35
media, "regardless of frontiers."

This latter clause, "regardless of frontiers," refers to the
application of this standard to all speech that crosses borders. Thus,
speech that is transmitted over the Internet should be given the same

freedom of expression protection as domestic speech, regardless of the
place of origination.36 This is particularly important to algorithmic
speech in the sense that many current forms of algorithmic speech
originate from servers located in other countries. For instance, despite

Google's web search being so popular that its name is often referred to
as a replacement for the service itself (e.g., "to google something"),
Google only operates twenty-one servers around the world, more than
half of which are located in the United States. 37
It is also important to note that freedom of expression protection
applies to information and ideas that may "offend, shock or disturb,"

and is not restricted only to those "that are favourably received or
38
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference."

Court emphasized that this is true "particularly in matters of public interest" and
referred to "itsjurisprudence established in numerous cases." See id.
35. This language is found in all of the aforementioned documents. See supra notes
30-33.
36. ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 19(2); CFREU, supra note 33, art. 11(1); ECHR,
supra note 31, art. 10(1). See also JAN OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM AS A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT 60-70 (2015) [hereinafter OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM]; JAN OSTER, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW 39 (2017) [hereinafter OSTER, MEDIA LAW]. Cf. Cox v.

Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 2933/03, ¶ 31 (2010), where an American citizen was
denied re-entry into Turkey for comments made about the Armenian genocide; the Court
stated "that the ban on the applicant's re-entry is materially related to her right to
freedom of expression because it disregards the fact that Article 10 rights are enshrined
'regardless of frontiers' and that no distinction can be drawn between the protected
freedom of expression of nationals and that of foreigners." Id.
Centers,
GOOGLE,
Staff,
Data
37.
Google
(last visited Feb.
https://www.google.comlabout/datacenters/inside/locations/index.html
22, 2020) [https://perma.ec/AY4P-TWQA] (archived Aug. 20, 2020). This number has
increased fairly dramatically over time-as of May 24, 2019, Google only had 16 data
centers. See id.
38. Handyside v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 5493/72, ¶ 49 (1976).
This principle is reiterated in, amongst others, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No.
1), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6538/74, ¶ 65 (1979); Lingens v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 9815/82, $ 41 (1986); Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
13778/88, ¶ 63 (1992); Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 1), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
39954/08, ¶ 78 (2012). This quotation was also used by the Inter-American Court in the
case of "The Last Temptation of Christ" (Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 47 (Feb. 5, 2001)), which was
later referenced in a number of cases. See, e.g., Kimel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations,

and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177, ¶ 88 (May 2, 2008); Canese v.
Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
111, ¶ 83 (Aug. 31, 2004); Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, ¶ 113 (July 2,
2004); Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, 1 152 (Feb. 6, 2001).
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However, the right to freedom of expression is not completely
unconstrained. Common limitations across these instruments are for
"national security, public order, or public health or morals," and the

right may not be fully realized if it comes into direct conflict with the
rights of another person.3 9 Therefore, the analysis of a supposed
freedom

of

expression

infringement

focuses

on

whether

the

interference was justified, taking into account the relevant conflicting
rights and interests. This framework will be examined in further detail
in Part 3.
Relatively little has been said in international jurisprudence

about freedom of expression on the Internet, much less algorithmic
speech. However, certain functions, such as the maintenance of
Internet news archives, has been explicitly held to be covered by Article

10 of the ECHR:
The Court has consistently emphasised that Article 10 guarantees not only the
right to impart information but also the right of the public to receive it. In light
of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of
information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's
access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally. The
maintenance of Internet archives is a critical aspect of this role and the Court
therefore considers that such archives fall within the ambit of the protection
afforded by Article 10.40

One could argue that similar logic could be extrapolated to cover
the algorithms used in search engines, for instance. Going forward, this
Article will examine how algorithmic speech, currently in its infancy,
has been viewed by academics and courts in the United States-as
academics have written on the issue fairly extensively and there are a
number of cases concerning search engines-before returning to the
international framework.
2. The United States' Framework and Algorithmic Speech
The United States examines the right to freedom of expression (or
rather freedom of speech) in quite a different manner than that just
described. While the US approach looks, a priori, at a particular act to
determine whether it qualifies as speech and is thus entitled to

protection, the international approach, as stated above, looks at
interferences to speech and whether they can be justified when taking

into account the relevant rights and interests. Regardless of the
framework, however, it may be useful to look at how commentators and

39. The quoted language is taken directly from the ACHR, although the ICCPR
uses almost identical wording, and the ECHR's language is very similar and touches
upon the same exceptions. See ACHR, supra note 32, art. 12, 1 3; see also ICCPR, supra
note 30, art. 19 ¶ 3(b); ECHR, supra note 31, art. 10 $ 2.
40. Times Newspapers, Ltd. v. United Kingdom (Nos. 1 & 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
Nos. 3002/03 & 23676/03, ¶ 27 (2009) (citations omitted).
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courts have approached algorithmic speech in the United States. In

several instances, federal district courts have held that algorithmic
speech is speech and thus entitled to protection.
In the United States, freedom of speech is a right enshrined in the
41
First Amendment to the Constitution, and it is typically broader than

the right to freedom of expression found internationally. Courts look to
whether an act can be considered "speech" and thus whether it should
be afforded protection under the First Amendment. There are
limitations, which are categorical in nature, and they are relatively
narrow in comparison to the justification analysis and balancing of
42
rights and interests utilized internationally.

There have been quite a number of articles written on the extent
to which algorithmic speech is protected by the First Amendment in
the United States, usually within the context of search engine results.
This has resulted in a vigorous debate with proponents on all areas of

the spectrum, advocating for a variety of theories with which to
approach the issue. Several academics have argued that the
algorithmic speech of search engines is protected by the First
Amendment.4 3 On the other hand, others have contended that this
algorithmic output should not be protected.4 4 Still others argue that a

41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." See id.
42. The extent to which speech may be prohibited or merely limited differ between
the categories, which include: obscenity (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973));
fighting words and offensive speech (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942)); false statements of fact (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)); child
pornography (New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)); speech that incites imminent
lawless action (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)); speech owned by others such
as through copyright or trademarks (Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985)); and commercial speech such as advertising (Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)). Additionally, courts presume any
restriction on speech to be invalid and the onus is on the government to convince the
court that the restriction is constitutional. For a look at how this is examined
internationally, see infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the "necessary in pursuit of the aim"
justification analysis) and Part III.B.3.a (describing the balancing of rights at play
within judicial oversight of freedom of expression, particularly for cases involving
algorithmic speech).
43. See generally Benjamin, supra note 9 (maintaining that current First
Amendment jurisprudence should be understood to cover a broad spectrum of
algorithmic output, especially those that involve a substantive communication); Volokh
& Falk, supra note 21 (contending that search engines exercise editorial judgment in
determining what information to convey to the user, and that they are analogous to
newspapers and book publishers and therefore protected by the First Amendment).
44. See generally Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 22 (observing that speech with a
low degree of expressiveness is commonly excluded from First Amendment protection
and that search engine results are less expressive than these categories of speech that
are excluded, in addition to the fact that these results are a form of speech that do not
realize First Amendment values despite them having a communicative function); Wu,
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more graduated or nuanced approach should be utilized, where
algorithmic speech should be protected in certain instances and denied
that protection in others. 45

In court, Google has repeatedly argued that its search results are
protected speech and thus protected by the First Amendment. In 2003,

Google argued in Search King, Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc. that its
PageRank results were subjective opinions. 46 Search King offered
search optimization to clients, and when Google discovered this, it
demoted the clients' ranking in its search results. In turn, Search King

sued Google for tortious interference with contract. The court found
Google's argument persuasive and held that Google's PageRanks did
not "contain provably false connotations" and were therefore opinions
entitled to "full constitutional protection."4 7 In another instance, a
different court found that an injunction sought that would shape
Google's search results would violate its First Amendment rights. 48
Another case involved the largest search engine provider in
China-Baidu. At the request of the Chinese government, Baidu

blocked results concerning the prodemocracy movement in China from
appearing in search results in the United States. 49 Whereas the
previous two cases engaged in little analysis on this issue, the court in
Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc. more thoroughly discussed this topic,5 0 and
found that "there is a strong argument to be made that the First
Amendment fully immunizes search-engine results from most, if not

supra note 23 (arguing that the First Amendment's functionality doctrine precludes
coverage from carriers/conduits and communicative tools; as such, search engines should
typically be classified as a tool as opposed to speech, and automated concierge services
as well, unless the opinions of the programmer are reflected in the output).
45. See generally Michael J. Ballanco, Comment, Searching for the First
Amendment: An Inquisitive Free Speech Approach to Search Engine Rankings, 24 GEO.
MASON U. C.R.L.J. 89 (2013) (advancing a fact-based analysis of whether the search
engine presents relatively neutral results, and if it is found that the search engine is
advancing its own commercial interest it should be considered commercial speech and
hence entitled to less protection by the First Amendment); Josh Blackman, What
Happens if Data Is Speech?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 25 (2014) (proposing a
framework that focuses

on the nexus

between algorithmic outputs and human

interaction; with more human interaction the output will be closer to what the human
created herself and thus deserving of protection, whereas if the output is relatively
autonomous with little human involvement it lies farther away from human expression
that warrants protection); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868
(2014) (positing that a search engine is neither a conduit that is categorically not entitled
to First Amendment protection or an editor that is, but an advisor that should not receive

protection where it deceives the user that it is supposed to inform).
46. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *3
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
47. Id. at *4.
48. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp.2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007).
49. Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp.3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal
withdrawn (2d Cir. 2014).
50. Id. at 436-43.
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51
all, kinds of civil liability and government regulation." The court
went on to discuss an argument for examining search engine results
52
under merely an intermediate level of scrutiny. Ultimately, the court

did not decide exactly which level of protection search engine results
should be afforded generally, but found that the intermediate scrutiny

53
test was inapplicable to the current case.
Google has made similar arguments in more recent cases. In a
2017 case, Google had delisted a number of e-ventures' websites from

its search results for violating its guidelines; Google was granted
summary judgment on the grounds that formulating search resultsincluding deciding which links to list and how to order or rank them54
are essentially editorial decisions protected by the First Amendment.
In 2019, in a case where a stock image company sued Google because

of its displeasure with how its ranking in search results had fallen

precipitously several years prior, Google moved for a judgment on the

55
pleadings partially upon the aforementioned arguments. Noting that

no appellate court had examined this issue, the court found that even
if search engines were generally protected, Google "[could not] hide
behind the First Amendment"-breach of contract could still occur, and
56
discovery would illuminate what in fact happened.

Amazon has also made similar arguments in a legal memorandum
submitted for a criminal case. 57 Here, police attempted to obtain a
search warrant to procure the voice recording, taken by Amazon
through its Alexa service, of the prime suspect in a murder

51. Id. at 438. The court outlined the principles it used as such: "First, as a general
matter, the Government may not interfere with the editorial judgments of private
speakers on issues of public concern-that is, it may not tell a private speaker what to
include or not to include in speech about matters of public concern. Second, that rule is
not 'restricted to the press, being enjoyed by business corporations generally and by
ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression as well as by professional
publishers.' Third, the First Amendment's protections apply whether or not a speaker
articulates, or even has, a coherent or precise message, and whether or not the speaker
generated the underlying content in the first place. And finally, it does not matter if the
Government's intentions are noble-for example, to promote 'press responsibility,' or to
prevent expression that is 'misguided, or even hurtful."' Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 439-41. The argument was originally made in Bracha & Pasquale, supra
note 22, at 1191-94, which relied upon the intermediary scrutiny used by the Supreme
Court when examining regulations of cable television operators that required the
operators to carry local broadcast stations in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 662 (1994). Typically, content-based speech restrictions are reviewed under strict
scrutiny, and content-neutral restrictions under intermediate scrutiny.

53. Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 439-41.
54. e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-646-FtM-PAM-CM,
2017 WL 2210029, at *8-9 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017).
55. Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google, LLC, No. C 18-01910 WHA, 2019 WL
2372280, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2019).
56. Id. at *3-4.
57. Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon's Motion to Quash Search
Warrant, Arkansas v. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Benton Cty. Cir. Ct., Feb. 17, 2017)
[hereinafter Amazon's Memorandum].
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investigation.5 8 Amazon argued that both the speech submitted to
Alexa by the user, as well as the responses generated by Alexa, 59 are
protected by the First Amendment and thus subject to heightened
scrutiny by a court.6 0 In the end, the court did not have to rule on the

matter as the defendant agreed to release the recordings. 6 1
Despite the categorical approach to freedom of expression in the
United States, the foregoing discussion shows that academics and
courts have struggled with analyzing algorithmic outputs, and the
struggle will continue as new forms emerge and claims for protection
are made. While current case law points in the direction that the
algorithmic output of search engines is constitutionally-protected
speech, the law is far from settled. The lack of clarity on this issue

equally applies-and perhaps even more so-to the international
framework, which we will return to in the following section.

B. How Might Algorithmic Speech Fit into the International
Framework
1. Attribution of Algorithmic Speech and Status as a Content Provider
or Intermediary
Another crucial question that must be answered is whether the

creators or controllers of the programs that produce algorithmic speech
should be

considered

content

providers or intermediaries. This

58.
Id. See also Debra Cassens Weiss, Alexa's Responses to Customers Are
Protected by The First Amendment, Amazon Argues in Murder Case, ABA J. (Feb. 27,
2017,
7:00
AM
CST),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/alexas responses to-customersareprotected
_bythefirstamendmentamazon_a/ [https://perma.cc/J6DF-8UV8] (archived Aug. 20,
2020).
Alexa is an interactive cloud service where users talk to an Alexa-enabled device in
order to "play music, answer general questions, set an alarm or timer and more." Alexa,
AMAZON

DEVELOPER

(Sept.

21,

2017),

https://web.archive.org/web/20170921015141/https://developer.amazon.com/alexa
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TZK8-6PDF?type=image] (archived Sept. 28,
2020).
59. For this latter argument, Amazon cited a couple of the aforementioned cases
such as Search King and Baidu. See Amazon's Memorandum, supra note 57, at 11-12.

60. Amazon argued that due to the heightened scrutiny, "it is the government's
burden to show both that (1) it has a 'compelling interest' in the requested information
and (2) there is a 'sufficient nexus' between the information sought and the underlying
inquiry of the investigation." Id. at 12.
61.
Allison Grande, Amazon Turns Over Recordings With Murder Suspect's OK,
LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2017, 8:11 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/899149/amazonturns-over-recordings-with-murder-suspect-s-ok
[https://perma.cc/5HZZ-GPKB]
(archived Aug. 20, 2020); Press Release, Kathleen T. Zellner & Associates, P.C., Amazon
Echo Subpoena in Arkansas Murder Case (Mar. 6, 2017), https://arstechnica.co.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/echoagreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6F7Q-V8NT] (archived
Aug. 20, 2020).
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determination ultimately has implications for liability, which will be
examined in the next subsection.

The authors or creators of information are considered content
providers, which may include publishers, news outlets, bloggers, or

even creators of YouTube videos. 62 On the other hand are mere speech
intermediaries or transmitters, such as communication networks,
newspaper vendors, search engines, social networks, and news

aggregators. 6 3 There is therefore a distinction between a content
provider or "the media" and a "medium"; the primary differentiator
between the two lies in the former's exercise of editorial control, which

is

the "creation, selection

or redaction of content

before

its

64

Furthermore, persons or entities are not to be
publication."
considered mere intermediaries if they provide their own content,

adopt third-party content, or initiate the dissemination or publication
of third-party content.

65

As algorithmic speech comes in many shapes and forms, it is not
immediately clear whether the creator of the speech should be
categorized as a content provider or a mere intermediary. At first
glance, it may seem clear that algorithmic speech is attributable
merely to the person-or company that employs the person-who
programmed the algorithm, or to the entity in control of the algorithm,
which in turn would deem that person or company the author.
However, this may not necessarily hold true in all instances.
Certain forms are relatively straightforward. For instance, the
publishers of automatically generated news stories no doubt exercise

editorial control over the content and would therefore be considered
content providers, regardless of whether they created the algorithm
originally. Similarly, with basic chat bots, where an algorithm
responds to user-submitted text with scripts prepared by either the
creator or controller-that entity is thus providing the content-hence

62. It is important to note the 'Internet content provider' may have a slightly
different understanding in common parlance. In the EU, a 'content provider' is "the
information source under communication theory." Jan Oster, Communication,
Defamation and Liability of Intermediaries, 35 LEGAL STUD. 348, 351 (2015) [hereinafter
Oster, Liability of Intermediaries]. In the U.S., 'information content provider' is defined
as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service." Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509,
§ 230(e)(3), 110 Stat. 56, 139 (1996).
63.

OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 57.

64. Id. at 58; see also Directive 2010/13/EU, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of
audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) Recitals 25 and 26;
Directive 2002/21/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services

(Framework Directive) art. 2(c).
65.

OSTER, MEDIA LAW, supra note 36, at 14; Oster, Liability of Intermediaries,

supra note 62, at 358.
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they should be deemed content providers as there is editorial control
in the text that is ultimately presented to the user.
Other forms of algorithmic speech are not so straightforward.

Attribution may become a bit more complicated when looking at
adaptive algorithms (semi-autonomous production), such as more

advanced chat bots, Microsoft's Tay, or a search engine's autocomplete
function, where the algorithmic speech production is a compilation of
the instant interaction combined with many interactions that had
occurred previously. 6 6 Thus when Tay started making racist comments
less than 24 hours after it was launched, 67 it was not only the result of
the programmers' algorithm but also of all those people who interacted
with it. Hence Microsoft is arguably not providing its own content-at
least not in whole. The company undoubtedly did not intend for Tay to
make comments such as "Hitlerwas right I hate the jews" and disabled
the Twitter account after only a day of being "in the wild." 68 On the

other hand, several bad actors did intend to "game" Tay so as to make
it speak the way it did. Microsoft did program Tay, but in a scenario
such as this, should Tay's speech be solely attributable to Microsoft?
One could argue that because users interacted with Tay's
algorithm in an abusive manner, the speech should not be attributable
to Microsoft. However, if someone is injured by hate speech or
defamation, etc., the question would remain as to who should be held
liable when the output is the amalgamation of many different users'
input, who may oftentimes be anonymous. 69

This scenario-which would also apply to a search engine's
autocomplete function-would require analysis under whether one's
own content was provided or whether third-party content was

adopted. 70 This is an objective standard based upon the perception of
an ordinary reasonable person. 71 A third-party statement being
adopted may be indicated by "whether the publisher invited the

statement, expressly approved of them or attached his brand name to

66.

Search

Using

Autocomplete,

GOOGLE,

https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230
(last visited Feb. 29, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/UEN7-WJEC] (archived Aug. 20, 2020) (stating that autocomplete
takes into account the text string that was entered, a user's relevant past searches, and
what other users are searching for, including trending stories). Interestingly, Google
claims that these suggestions "[a]re not statements by other people or Google about
[one's] search terms." Id.
67.
Helena Horton, Microsoft Deletes 'Teen Girl' AI After It Became a HitlerLoving Sex Robot Within 24 Hours, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2016, 3:37 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/03/24/microsofts-teen-girl-ai-turns-into-ahitler-loving-sex-robot-wit/ [https://perma.cc/L8NM-U6Z8] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
68. Id.
69. For a more thorough discussion on these issues, see infra Parts II.B.2.,
concerning liability, and III.B.3.a., concerning other rights and interest at play in the
balancing exercise.
70. Oster, Liability of Intermediaries, supra note 62, at 359.
71. Id. at 358.
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them."72 Consequently, neither providing your own content nor
adopting a third party's requires that a particular statement is
endorsed, and persons or entities could be considered content providers
73
even if the statement is not reflective of their opinion. To an ordinary
reasonable person, it likely appears that Microsoft Tay or the search

engine's autocomplete function are presenting new content (or are at

least adopting third-party content), and thus they should be considered
74
content providers even if they do not officially support the output.
However, the fact that this standard is a bit of a moving target may
change the analysis-people may become more tech-savvy and
informed, which would make an ordinary reasonable person realize

that this algorithmic output is not content provided by Microsoft Tay
or the search engine. Search engines could also potentially circumvent
this by showing a large notice informing users, when they are
searching, that the suggestions are merely trending text strings of
other users.
Even where users are not purposefully attempting to game the
algorithm or interact with it in an abusive manner, it may result in a

breach of the law. The output of a search engine's autocomplete
function has been found to be defamatory, 75 as have web and image
search results, 76 and image search results appear to be discriminatory
in some instances. 77 In some sense, it seems unjust to consider these

72. Id. at 359. See also Law Soc'y v. Kordowski [2011] EWHC (QB) 3185 (Eng.).
73. Oster, Liability of Intermediaries, supra note 62, at 359.
74. See
BGH,
May
14,
2013,
VI
ZR
269/12,
9
(Ger.),
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=64163&pos=0&anz=1
[https://perma.cc/KQW5-2SPP] (archived July 11, 2020) (finding that users expect that
"the search queries completed through the suggested word combination reflect contentrelated relationships"); Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Google's Autocomplete Function-is Google
a Publisher or a Mere Technical Distributor?, 3 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 318 (2013).
However, this principle this decision is not accepted in all jurisdictions, and there have
been a number of cases in different jurisdictions that have reached divergent conclusions
using a variety of reasoning. See Stavroula Karapapa & Maurizio Borghi, Search Engine
Liability for Autocomplete Suggestions: Personality, Privacy and the Power of the
Algorithm, 23 INT'L J.L. INFO. TECH. 261, 275-81 (2015) (discussing a number of
autocomplete cases throughout Europe).
75. See Karapapa & Borghi, supra note 74, at 278-81.
76. See Milorad Trkulja v Google Inc LLC [No 5](2012) VSC 533 (Austl.).
Matthew Kay, Cynthia Matuszek & Sean A. Munson, Unequal Representation
77.
and Gender Stereotypes in Image Search Results for Occupations, ASSOC. COMPUTING
MACHINERY

(2015),

https://www.csee.umbc.edu/-cmat/Pubs/KayMatuszekMunsonCHI2015GenderlmageSe
arch.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX2K-J9JG] (archived Aug. 20, 2020). In this study conducted
in the U.S., professions were searched for in Google's image search to for gender biases
in the results. One particularly notable finding was that the results when searching for
"CEO": the percentage of women in the top 100 results was 11%, whereas the actual
percentage of CEOs who are women in the U.S. is 27%. It was also found that the when
exposed to the skewed results, this resulted in a feedback loop that further reinforced
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algorithmic speech outputs the speech of the search engine when it is
in fact largely a reflection of society's suspicions, preconceived
opinions, or biases.
Even if a reasonable person does not view autocomplete
suggestions as the content of the search engine, or Tay's tweets as that
of Microsoft, in these instances, there may also be the exercise of

editorial control. Although the output is not scripted to the same extent
as basic chat bots, a programmer still designed the algorithm which
generates the output, 78 and the preemptive policies used could be

viewed as a form of ex ante editorial control, 79 such as through making
certain topics or combinations of text off-limits ab initio.80 Despite the

fact that Google states that its search engine's autocomplete
"predictions are generated by an algorithm automatically without
human involvement," 81 Google redacts material that is sexually
explicit, hateful, violent, or dangerous, 82 thus showing some measure
of editorial control.

At the same time, search engines may be considered mere
intermediaries in regard to the algorithms that determine search
results in the consideration of whether one's own content was provided

or whether third-party content was adopted. Unlike the autocomplete
function, to an ordinary reasonable person it is likely clear that search

engine results are lists of content that are neither provided nor adopted
by the search engine itself, as they only present excerpts and links to
content provided elsewhere. Among those discussed here, this form of
algorithm (as well as those that may have similar functionality) is the

one that is most likely to succeed if the creator or controller argues that

these biases. See also Adrienne LaFrance, Be Careful What You Google, ATLANTIC (Apr.
10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/be-careful-what-yougoogle/390207/ [https://perma.cc/LU8Q-ECZS] (archived Aug. 20, 2020); Jennifer
Langston, Who's a CEO? Google Image Results Can Shift Gender Biases, U. WASH. NEWS
(Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washington.edu/news/2015/04/09/whos-a-ceo-google-imageresults-can-shift-gender-biases/ [https://perma.cc/J476-W8DT] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
To my knowledge, search results such as these have not been contested in court, but they
have been part of the push for the need for algorithmic accountability. See infra Part
III.A. for more information on this movement.
78. See also Karapapa & Borghi, supra note 74, at 274 (stating that one of the
judicial trends holds that the autocomplete function introduces "an additional source of
informative content of which the search engine is solely responsible" and thus is no
longer a mere intermediary).
79.
Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)7 of the Comm. of
Ministers to member states on a new notion of media, adopted Sept. 21, 2011, 1 32 (2011),
https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/committee-of-ministers
[https://perma.cc/4EY4-U5MB] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
80. This could have implications for self-censorship. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
81.
How
search
predictions
work
on
Google,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230
(last visited Feb. 29, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/248W-3KKR] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
82.
Autocomplete
Policies,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/7368877
(last visited Feb. 29, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/7NQG-8FQV] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
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it is a mere intermediary and thus may avail itself of the associated
limitations of liability discussed in the following subpart. However, it
is possible that editorial control could be found in the determination

and ranking of search results.83
Finally, even if there is a complete lack of oversight or redaction,
as was apparently the case with Microsoft Tay, editorial control may
arguably still be found. When "one-to-many" traditional media outlets,

such as broadcasters or newspapers, disseminate third-party content,
and have the ability to edit the content but elect not to exercise
editorial control, then they must be considered primary publishers and

not mere intermediaries. 84 While autocomplete functions and bots on
social media platforms do not neatly fall into this category, they
essentially operate as a "one-to-many" form of communication. "Manyto-many" (often online) platforms of communication do not exercise
editorial control over third-party content published, so long as they are

not aware of the harmful speech being published, are not able to
85
prevent its dissemination, and do not adopt or modify the content. In
any case, many of these companies have shown that they are able to
86
largely prevent the dissemination of harmful speech.

Creators or controllers of these algorithms may be in a bit of a
quandary-the more (editorial) control they exert in order to avoid
87
undesirable outputs, the more they open themselves to liability. Not

only would the process to filter out defamatory remarks be extremely
complicated in some cases, 88 it may also have further implications

&

83. It is interesting to note that U.S. courts have made this exact finding-that
search engines exercise editorial control in determining their search results, including
how they are ranked. See, e.g., e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:14-cv646-FtM-PAM-CM, 2017 WL 2210029, at *8-9 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017); Zhang v.
Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
84. Oster, Liability of Intermediaries, supra note 62, at 361.
85. Id.
86. See Elizabeth Schulze, EU Says Facebook, Google and Twitter Are Getting
2019),
4,
(Feb.
CNBC
Online,
Speech
Hate
Removing
at
Faster
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/facebook-google-and-twitter-are-getting-faster-at[https://perma.cc/6VZS-7W9Y] (archived
removing-hate-speech-online-eu-finds--.html
Aug. 20, 2020). Interestingly, however, the algorithms that are used to detect such
speech may themselves be biased. See Thomas Davidson, Debasmita Bhattacharya
Ingmar Weber, Racial Bias in Hate Speech and Abusive Language Detection Datasets,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD WORKSHOP ON ABUSIVE LANGUAGE ONLINE 25 (Aug. 1,
2019), https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/W19-3504.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VTZ-UFKQ]
(archived Aug. 20, 2020). This essentially is treating platforms like governments, but
without the same level of accountability to the public. Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts
2019),
(Sept.
22,
ATLANTIC
Demand,
by
Popular
Speech
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebook-restricts-free-speechpopular-demand/598462/ [https://perma.ccIDJ9M-YLCW] (archived Aug. 20, 2020).
87. This may explain Google's explanation above regarding how autocomplete
suggestions are formulated.
For search results, this would be notably harder than for an advanced chat
88.
bot. For instance, a search engine could create an algorithm to trawl the Internet to
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down the line-holding search engines potentially liable in these
instances could lead to them eventually removing features such as
these. 89 On the other hand, in cases where the entity is deemed to be a
provider, perhaps users interacting with the algorithm in an abusive

manner could be a mitigating factor in a potential award of damages. 90
The question might ultimately become whether the benefits (such as
to the right to receive information) outweigh the costs to such an extent

so as to find that the speech should, in principle, not be attributed to
search engines-after all, autocomplete suggestions, for instance, are
largely just holding a mirror up to society. Or are features such as these
merely an unnecessary convenience?
Legislators and courts will increasingly have to deal with these
issues, and regulation may be needed so as to provide guidance and
more clearly identify to whom algorithmic speech should be attributed
and how entities should be classified, as there will no doubt arise new

forms of algorithmic speech that will further push these already
ambiguous boundaries. 91 Many questions remain, and, as will be seen

decide whether the text string that was searched for is true. However, having it discern
between truth and falsity online would be extremely difficult. Even if it were to give
greater weight to trusted sources or news organizations, the algorithm would likely have
trouble if those sources published a mostly true story or a story about rumors, even if
they were disproving them. Perhaps with time such algorithms may be developed so as
to make this possible. See also Sean MacAvaney, Hao-Ren Yao, Eugene Yang, Katina
Russell, Nazil Goharian & Ophir Frieder, Hate Speech Detection: Challenges and
Solutions, 14 PLoS ONE, Aug. 20, 2019, at 1, 2 n.8 (2019) (noting challenges in detecting
hate speech using machine learning techniques).
89. Whether or not they will actually be held liable requires further analysis. See
infra Part II.B.2.
90.
Compare Wannes Vandenbussche, Rethinking Non-Pecuniary Remedies for
Defamation: The Case for Court-Ordered Apologies 22-23 (Aug. 22, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript),

https://poseidonO1.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=7560210720241220961230840950040160
690150320090510540040220041260250311210940990690780070520030230300140550
911131060970930651260560220880320931210901240930780810010250530060120930
831020000740850931050210740800871051121210890660270730160860641061240940
64&EXT=pdf [https://perma.cc/9458-SUSJ (archived Aug. 20, 2020) (stating that in
many countries across Europe, courts order retractions or apologies "in addition to or in
lieu of monetary damages" (emphasis omitted)) with Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 106
S.E.2d 258, 263 (S.C. 1958) ("Retraction of a libel is matter to be considered in mitigation,
but does not bar punitive damages in the absence of a statute so providing."). The
"innocent dissemination" defense in England would also be relevant here; for further
information and how it fits with limited liability provisions internationally, see infra
Part II.B.2.a.
91. One might look to copyright law's standards on originality in relation to
computer-generated works for guidance on how to attribute algorithmic speech.
However, as these standards struggle to address newer forms of computer-generated
works in the first place, it may prove difficult to extrapolate and apply to the situation
at hand. Authorship of a work is largely dependent on the element of originality. In a
case before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) involving a Danish
computerized service that scanned various newspapers to produce 11-word extracts, the
Court found that these snippets could satisfy the originality requirement of copyright so
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in the following Parts, courts across Europe have struggled with how
to examine search engine autocomplete suggestions, and it is far from

settled. 92

long as they express the "author's own intellectual creation." Case C-5/08, Infopaq
International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-06569, ¶ 37. For most
forms of algorithmic speech, it is difficult to imagine how the output could be the
interacting user's "own intellectual creation", much less for responses from an
autocomplete suggestion or from Microsoft Tay, given the programming behind the
algorithm and the influence of the inputs of other users. See id.
The U.K. is one of a few jurisdictions that have a law that speaks more directly to
computer-generated works. Section 9(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
(CDPA) 1988, c. 48 (U.K.), states:
"In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is
computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the
arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken."
This provision could provide guidance for one-to-one chat bots such as Microsoft's
Zo (the successor to Tay). Assuming the chat bot does not incorporate the inputs of other
users-and it is unclear to what extent it does-it could be argued that the responses of
Zo could be attributed to the user as they made the "arrangements necessary for the
creation of the work." However, the provision would still have problems with one-tomany chat bots, such as Tay, that incorporate the input of other users: how could the
outputs of Tay be attributed to potentially thousands of (many times anonymous) users?
While the spirit of the law appears to favor the programmer in cases of ambiguity in
cases involving copyright, the Whitford Committee has stated that "the author of the
output can be none other than the person, or persons, who devised the instructions and
originated the data used to control and condition a computer to produce a particular
result." See WHITFORD COMMITTEE, COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS LAW: REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE LAW ON COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS, 1977, Cmnd. 6732, at ¶

513 (UK).
Applying this to algorithmic speech, the determining factor in such cases may be
the "particularresult", given that the responses of algorithms that produce speech are
usually unpredictable. There is no doubt a need for further clarification on this issue, in
both the context of copyright as well as the attribution of algorithmic speech. For a more
in-depth analysis and comparison of the originality element in copyright law of
computer-generated works in the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., see Andres Guadamuz, Do
Androids Dream of Electric Copyright? Comparative Analysis of Originality in Artificial
Intelligence Generated Works, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 169 (2017).
92. Karapapa & Borghi, supra note 74, at 275-78. In one particularly interesting
instance, an Italian court found that the autocomplete function makes the search engine
neither an intermediary nor a content provider; it performs 'active hosting' and lies
somewhere between the two. See Trib. di Milano, Ordinanza, 23 maggio 2013 (It.); see
also infra Part II.B.2.a.
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2. Liability for Algorithmic Speech
As alluded to above, the determination of who is a content provider
informs the extent of liability. Content providers-those who provide
their own content, adopt third-party content, exercise editorial control,
or initiate the dissemination of third-party content-are typically held
fully liable for the content that they publish. 93 Conversely, mere
intermediaries enjoy limited liability, or in some instances, immunity,

as they may not be aware of the exact content that they are
transmitting.94 As such, and given the foregoing discussion, this Part

will focus on search engines and their algorithms that produce search
results, and the extent to which they may limit their liability.
Limited liability frameworks may vary substantially by country,

although there is some level of harmonization within the European
Union. 95 A good, albeit broad, international definition of the principle
of limited liability for intermediaries may be found in paragraph 2(a)

of the Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet,
which states:
No one who simply provides technical Internet services such as providing access,
or searching for, or transmission or caching of information, should be liable for
content generated by others, which is disseminated using those services, as long
as they do not specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey a court order
to remove that content, where they have the capacity to do so ('mere conduit
principle').

96

93. OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 58; OSTER, MEDIA LAW, supra note
36, at 14; Oster, Liability of Intermediaries, supra note 62, at 358. In some instances,
content providers may also avoid liability as well through the use of defenses of honest
opinion, publication on a matter of public interest, or parliamentary privilege. See id. at
351.
94.

OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 58-59.

95.. This is largely due to the E-Commerce Directive, infra note 98. See generally
IGNACIO GARROTE FERNANDEZ-DIEZ, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON NATIONAL APPROACHES
TO THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES FOR INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND

RELATED RIGHTS 67, 71-72 (World Intellectual Property Organization 2010); see also
World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap), STAN. L. SCH. CTR. FOR INTERNET AND
Soc'Y, https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu/map [https://perma.cc/2K45-QY2T] (archived
Aug. 20, 2020)
96.
Frank LaRue (U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion & Expression),
Dunja Mijatovid (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative
on Freedom of the Media), Catalina Botero Marino (OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Expression) & Faith Pansy Tlakula (ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression & Access to Information), Joint declaration on freedom of expression and the
Internet,
OSCE
(June
1,
2011),
¶
2(a),
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/9/78309.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KC6-ASR8]
(archived Sept. 15, 2020) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
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Different forms of the "mere conduit" principle have become quite well
established internationally, although there are some differences

between the standards and their scope. 97
a. The European Framework

The

European Union

Directive) governs

Directive

2000/31/EC

(E-Commerce

the liability of intermediaries within member

states; 98 the results to be achieved are binding, but the forms and
99
methods to reach those results are left to the national authorities.
Article 12 of the Directive protects intermediaries that are a "mere
conduit," and, although its usage in this provision is slightly different
100
The Ethan that used above, the principle is largely the same.
Commerce Directive further distinguishes intermediaries that perform

"caching" and hosting functions in Articles 13 and 14, respectively, and

the framework for liability differs between these three "classes" of
intermediaries. 101

Generally, these provisions provide protection from liability to
intermediaries whose roles are "merely technical,

automatic and

passive," and do not protect those that play "an active role of such a
10 2
kind as to give [them] knowledge of, or control over, the data stored."
Within the confines of the E-Commerce Directive, this concept of data

encompasses

97.

most illegal

material, such as hate speech,

child

See generally GARROTE FERNANDEZ-DIEZ, supra note 95.

98. Council Directive 2000/31/EC, Directive on Electronic Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L
178) 1, 13 (EC) [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive].
99. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 288, Jun. 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
100. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 98. Article 12 'Mere conduit' states:
"1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient
of the service, or the provision of access to a communication network, Member
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information
transmitted, on condition that the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the
transmission.
2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in
paragraph 1 include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the
information transmitted in so far as this takes place for the sole purpose of
carrying out the transmission in the communication network, and provided that
the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary
for the transmission."
101. Id. art. 13-14.
102. Id.; see also Deli AS v. Estonia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015) App. No. 64569/09, 1 52;
Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France and Google, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier
SA, Google France v. Viaticum SA, and Luteciel S.A.R.L. and Google France v. Centre
national de recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L., 2010 E.C.R. I-02417,
¶¶ 113-14, 121.
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pornography, the infringement of intellectual property rights, and
defamatory content.10 3

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the
principal judicial authority in the EU, which is tasked with ensuring
the uniform application and interpretation of EU law,1 04 and it has
examined the intermediary liability provisions of the E-Commerce
Directive on a number of occasions. A notable case in this regard
involved the selling of goods on an online platform that infringed
trademark rights. In L'Ordal v. eBay, the court found that the
limitation of liability for hosting providers in Article 14(1) applies to an

"operator of an online marketplace" so long as it "has not played an
active role allowing it to have knowledge or control of the data
stored."1 05 However, even if the platform has not played an "active
role," the limitation will not apply if the platform was "aware of facts
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is

apparent" and with that awareness it failed to act expeditiously to
remove or disable access to the illegal content.1 06 This reiterated the
rule in Google France v. Louis Vuitton,10 7 a case involving ads for
counterfeit goods being shown when a trademarked term was entered
in the search engine. There, the court found that "concordance between
the keyword selected and the search term entered by an internet user
is not sufficient of itself to justify the view that Google has knowledge

of, or control over, the data entered into its system by advertisers and
stored in memory on its server," but also that "the role played by Google

103. See First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC, at 12, COM
(2003) 702 final (Nov. 21, 2003) ("The limitations on liability provided for by the Directive
are established in a horizontal manner, meaning that they cover liability, both civil and
criminal, for all types of illegal activities initiated by third parties.").
104. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 19, Oct. 12, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 13. The CJEU also considers the human rights enshrined in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; however, this consideration is
superficial in comparison with the analysis undertaken by the European Court of Human
Rights when examining alleged violations of the European Convention on Human Rights
brought before it. See id.
105. Case C-324/09, L'Oreal SA v. eBay International AG, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011, ¶
123. An active role would be found where "it provides assistance which entails, in
particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting
them." See id.
106. Id. ¶ 119-20, 124; E-Commerce Directive, supra note 98, art. 14(1)(a)-(b).
107. See Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France and Google Inc. v. Louis
Vuitton Malletier SA, Google France v. Viaticum SA, and Luteciel S.A.R.L. and Google
France v. Centre national de recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L., 2010
E.C.R. 1-02417, ¶ 120 ("Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 must be interpreted as meaning
that the rule laid down therein applies to an internet referencing service provider in the
case where that service provider has not played an active role of such a kind as to give it
knowledge of, or control over, the data stored. If it has not played such a role, that service
provider cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at the request of an
advertiser, unless, having obtained knowledge of the unlawful nature of those data or of
that advertiser's activities, it failed to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to
the data concerned.").
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in the drafting of the commercial message which accompanies the
advertising link or in the establishment or selection of keywords is

relevant."1

08

European Union member states must implement the E-Commerce
Directive into their domestic legislation, which varies to some extent

between the states. Even where the specific laws may appear different,
the framework is still evident. For example, in the United Kingdom,
the E-Commerce Directive was implemented through the Electronic

Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations of 2002.109 In cases that concern
online defamation in England, this must be interpreted in coordination
with other laws concerning defamation and the common law, which
leads to some differences in terminology, yet the underlying principles
function the same and in accordance with the E-Commerce Directive.
Both content providers and intermediaries-if they knew or should
have known of the defamatory content-can be considered publishers,

1 0
who are then liable unless they are able to make a defense. ' Only
intermediaries may avail themselves of the "innocent publication"
defense,"' which may be defeated if the intermediary fails to respond
2
to a notice of complaint within an adequate time frame.11 There are

108. Id. T¶ 117-18. The Court did not ultimately rule on this and left it for the
national court. Id. ¶ 119.
109. Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013, arts.
17-19 (U.K.). Articles 17, 18, and 19 apply to mere conduits, caching providers, and
hosting providers, respectively, and they are almost verbatim replicas of the provisions
in the E-Commerce Directive. See id.
110. Whether intermediaries maybe considered publishers, without knowledge of
the defamatory content, is a point of contention. Compare Godfrey v. Demon Internet,
Ltd. [1999] EWHC (QB) 244, [2001] [QB] 201 (Eng.) (Morland J) (ruling that under
English common law that the ISP would clearly be the publisher of the content) with
Bunt v. Tilley [2006] EWHC (QB) 407, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1243 (Eng.) (Eady J) (finding that
"an ISP which performs no more than a passive role in facilitating postings on the
internet cannot be deemed to be a publisher at common law" unless he knew, or should
have known when exercising reasonable care, that the publication was likely to be
defamatory). Academics have also reached different conclusions on this matter. Compare
Oster, Liability of Intermediaries, supra note 62, at 356-57 (arguing that it is illogical
for an intermediary to become a publisher only after it becomes aware of the defamatory
content-this is actually part of the innocent publication defense-and that
intermediaries should be considered publishers if "they actively participate in making
content known to another person, disregarding their knowledge of its defamatory
character"; as such, it is a factual determination) with Karapapa & Borghi, supra note
74, at 272-73 (following a line of precedent including Bunt v. Tilly [confirmed in Tamiz
v. Google [2013] EWCA (Civ) 68, [2012] EWHC (QB) 449 (Eng.)] to conclude that the
considerations on whether an intermediary is a publisher change "after notification they
knew or had reason to believe that their continued hosting of the materials caused, or
contributed to, the publication of a defamatory statement").
111. This is also known as the 'innocent dissemination' defense, and it corresponds
to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive; in essence, this means that the intermediary
took reasonable care in its publication and did not know nor have reason to believe that
the publication was defamatory. See Defamation Act 1996, c. 31, § 1 (U.K.). It should be
noted that some defenses are available to content providers as well. See supra note 93
and accompanying text.
112. See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 5(3) (U.K.).

2020]

ALGORI THMIC SPEECHAND FREEDOM OFEXPRESSION

1353

systems outside of the EU that utilize a similar framework to that

found in the United Kingdom. 113 Canada is one such country,11 4 as is
Australia, where, in a case concerning defamatory connections in

image and web results, Google was held liable for not removing the
offending material within a reasonable time after it knew of the
defamation complaint. 115
While the CJEU has given guidance on the liability of certain
online intermediaries, it has yet to provide more specific direction on
how to analyze claims involving algorithmic speech. However, some
national courts in Europe have had to interpret and apply the limited
liability provisions of the E-Commerce Directive in cases involving a
search engine's autocomplete function on a number of occasions,

leading to different results. Most of these cases have concerned
defamation, when a person or company's name was paired with
unbecoming autocomplete suggestions. In a number of cases in Italy,1 16
France,1 17 and Germany,1 18 the provisions of the E-Commerce
Directive (or rather their equivalent provisions in domestic law) were

found not to apply to the autocomplete function, and thus the search
engine (primarily Google) was held liable for the infringing content.
However, in another instance, an Italian court found that Google was

113. This is likely due to the shared common law histories of the countries.
114. See Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from
Abroad, 28 HARv. J.L. TECH. 289, 305-08 (2014).
115. See Milorad Trkulja v Google Inc LLC (No 5) [2012] VSC 533, No. 10096/2009
(Supreme Court of Victoria) (Austl.). Justice Beach of the Supreme Court of Victoria
awarded the plaintiff $200,000 in this case. See id.
116. See AB v. Google, Trib. Ordinario di Milano, 24 marzo 2011 (It.) (deciding that
Google went beyond the mere hosting of user's searches when it automatically presented
suggestions to other users based on conscious and commercially-based decision to do so);
see also Trib. di Milano, Ordinanza 23 maggio 2013 (It.) (citing C-324/09, L'Ordal SA v.
eBay International AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, the court found that limitations of liability
must be "limited to situations where the service provider is a mere intermediary of the
information, totally unrelated to the content and thereby completely passive with respect
to the content transmitted by third parties on the internet"; in doing so, the court coined
the term 'active hosting', in other words, a service that lies between a content provider

and mere intermediary, which may not utilize the E-Commerce hosting defense).
117. See Mme C/Google France, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court
of original jurisdiction] Montpellier, Oct. 28, 2010, (Fr.), aff'd, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional
court of appeal] Montpellier, civ., Sept. 29, 2011 (Fr.). In this case, the plaintiffs name
was associated with the title of an adult movie, and a similar conclusion was found to
that in AB v. Google, Trib. Ordinario di Milano, 24 marzo 2011 (It.).
118. See
BGH,
May
14,
2013,
VI
ZR
269/12
(Ger.),
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=64163&pos=0&anz=1
[https://perma.cc/KQW5-2SPP] (archived July 11, 2020) (finding that word associations,
such as those resulting from an autocomplete suggestion, impart meaning and thus have
the capability to be defamatory, and holding Google liable for not removing the false
associations after receiving notification).
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119
acting as a "caching" service within the meaning of the Directive,
22
20
and still other courts in Italy,1 Switzerland,121 and France1 held

that the search engine is not liable based upon other reasons. As is
apparent, and in order to achieve more uniformity, clear direction is

needed in this area-whether through updated legislation or decisions
by the CJEU.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also examined

cases that concern the liability of intermediaries. In contrast to the
CJEU, which interprets EU law, the ECtHR hears cases that involve

allegations of violations of human rights perpetrated by a member
state of the Council of Europe.12 3 As such, it does not have the
authority to rule on whether EU law was properly applied, as this lies
within the competence of the CJEU. However, in two cases, the ECtHR

has stated that additional factors should be taken into consideration
12 4
regarding the liability of intermediaries in certain scenarios.

In one such case, Delfi v. Estonia, a news website was found to be
liable for user comments posted in response to a news article, even
25
after it took down the offending comments upon notification.1 As this
case was heard by the ECtHR as opposed to the CJEU, the court did

119. See X v. Google, Trib. Ordinario di Milano, N RG 2012/68306, 25 mazzio 2013
(It.) (holding that Google is acting as a 'caching' service and thus may utilize the relevant
defense in the E-Commerce Directive; as the autocomplete suggestions are based upon
an algorithm, they are not under Google's control within the meaning of being
structured, organized or influenced).
120. See X v. Google, Trib. Ordinario di Pinerolo, 23 mazzio 2012 (It.) (finding that
autocomplete word associations may embody opinions and thus a defamatory meaning
only where the statement is not true and the question was asked in a rhetorical or
malicious manner).

121. See Albert Tanneur Institut & Co v. Google Inc, Tribunal Cantonal du Jura,
12 Feb. 2011 (Switz.) (imposing an obligation on search engines to remove autocomplete
suggestions that may infringe one's personality right would not be proportionate as it
"would restrict inadmissibly the right to information" and would make continuing
operation impossible in the face of potential liability).
122. See Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], le civ.,
Feb. 19, 2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 19 (Fr.) (Pierre B. v. Google Inc.); Cour de Cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., Jun. 19, 2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 625 (Fr.)
(Google v. Lyonnaise de garantie). In both of these cases, the French Supreme Court
found that an autocomplete function's word associations are only a technical method to
facilitate a search and are not expressions of opinion, which are necessary to base a claim
of defamation. See Cour de Cassation, le civ., Feb. 19, 2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 19; Cour de
Cassation, le civ., Jun. 19, 2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 625.
123. The Council of Europe is significantly larger than the European Union, and
has 47 member states compared to the EU's 28. For these 19 countries outside the scope
of the EU, the ECtHR decisions on intermediary liability discussed below will have
comparatively more importance on this issue than for their EU brethren. In addition, it
should be reemphasized that the CJEU takes into account human rights issues in its
rulings. See supra note 104.
124. See generally Delfi AS v. Estonia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 64569/09, (2015);
Magyar Tartalomszolgaltat6k Egyesiilete & Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 22947/13, (2016) [hereinafter MTE v. Hungary].
125. See Delfi AS v. Estonia ¶ 162.
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not rule on whether the limited liability provisions of the E-Commerce

Directive were properly applied.12 6 However, the court was satisfied
that the news portal's exercise of control over the user comment section
was such that it "went beyond that of a passive, purely technical
service provider" and thus it played an "active role" within the
meanings given to those concepts by Google France v. Louis Vuitton
and L'Oreal v. eBay. 127 Further, the decision may also have
implications for the future liability of intermediaries. 128 The court
identified a number of aspects to be analyzed in order to determine

whether holding the company liable for the comments posted by thirdparty users violates its freedom of expression, which include: "the

context of the comments, the measures applied by the applicant
company in order to prevent or remove defamatory comments, the

liability of the actual authors of the comments as an alternative to the
applicant company's liability, and the consequences of the domestic
proceedings for the applicant company." 129 Ultimately, the court held

126. Id. ¶ 81. The proper forum for this case should have been the CJEU. See
Oster, Liability of Intermediaries, supra note 62, at 360; OsTER, MEDIA LAW, supra note
36, at 238-39.
127. Delfi AS v. Estonia ¶T 52-53, 146; see also Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google
France and Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, Google France v. Viaticum SA,
and Luteciel S.A.R.L. and Google France v. Centre national de recherche en relations
humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L., 2010 E.C.R. I-02417, 1T 113-14, 120-21; Case C-324/09,
L'Oreal SA v. eBay International AG, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011, ¶¶ 113, 116, 123.
128. While the court limited the scope of the decision so as to not include Internet
discussion forums like bulletin boards, social media platforms that do not offer their own
content, or content providers that are persons running a blog as a hobby, the line drawn
is tenuous at best. There is little reason for Internet news portals that "provide for
economic purposes a platform for user-generated comments on previously published
content" to be distinguished from social media platforms. This implies that social media
platforms are apparently able to escape liability solely because they did not publish
content and invite users to comment-they merely let users publish content and invite
other users to comment for economic purposes. If anything, social media networks such
as Facebook would have more capacity (both economically and technologically) to be able
to actively monitor illegal content through the use of algorithms and/or employees than
a small local newspaper. See Delfi v. Estonia ¶¶ 115-16; see also infra note 129 and
accompanying text; Ingrid Lunden, Facebook to Add 3,000 to Team Reviewing Posts with
Hate Speech, Crimes, and Other Harming Posts, TECHCRUNCH (May 3, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/03/facebook-to-hire-3000-to-review-posts-with-hatespeech-crimes-and-other-harming-posts/ [https://perma.cc/3KWX-6DRU] (archived Aug.
21. 2020). Cf. MTE v. Hungary, supra note 124, T¶ 64, 91, where, in a situation very
similar to Delfi v. Estonia, it was found that a news portal should not have been held
liable for the comments of its users; the distinguishing difference was that the comments
concerned did not constitute unlawful speech, such as hate speech or incitement to
violence. The Court also reiterated the importance of inviting users to comment for
"economic benefit" and found MTE's status as a self-regulatory non-profit body to be a
contributing factor in its analysis.
129. MTE v. Hungary, supra note 124, ¶ 142. Some commentators have found that
the implications of the Court's decision troubling from a freedom of expression
standpoint, in that "(1) takedown upon notice is insufficient to avoid liability, (2) there
may be some affirmative duty to monitor user-generated content, and (3) permitting
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that there had been no violation of Defli's freedom of expression
through the imposition of liability.
However, in MTE v. Hungary, which contained a similar factual

scenario to that in Delfi,1 30 the ECtHR appeared to take a step back
from the earlier judgment and found that there was a violation of
31
In
freedom of expression in holding the intermediaries liable.1
making its decision, the court took into account the context and content

of the impugned comments, the liability of the actual authors of the
comments, the measures taken by the applicants and the conduct of
the injured party, the consequences of the comments for the injured
32
The determining
party, and the consequences for the applicants.1

factor-and the primary difference with Delfi-was that the comments
did not rise to the level of hate speech or incitement to violence.133
As one can see, the analysis for intermediary liability may differ

substantially depending on the court that is hearing the case due to
the scope of judicial review. While the proper forum for cases involving
intermediary liability under the E-Commerce Directive is the CJEU, it

remains to be seen if, or to what extent, the CJEU will adopt some of
the factors proposed by the ECtHR.
b. The United States and Elsewhere
The European framework can be contrasted with that found in the

United States. The United States extends the "mere conduit" principle
beyond the access provider level to both the hosting and content

anonymous posting should count against an intermediary's immunity." See Omer, supra
note 114, at 313-14 (citing Gabrielle Guillemin, Case Law, Strasbourg: Delfi AS v
Estonia: Court Strikes Serious Blow to Free Speech Online, INFORM'S BLoG (Oct. 15,
2013), https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/15/case-law-strasbourg-delfi-as-v-estoniacourt-strikes-serious-blow-to-free-speech-online-gabrielle-guillemin/
[https://perma.cc/ZJ7A-5MEZ] (archived Aug. 21, 2020)). Two of the presiding judges also
took issue with the judgment of the Court, saying that "all comments will have to be
monitored from the moment they are posted. As a consequence, active intermediaries
and blog operators will have considerable incentives to discontinue offering a comments
feature, and the fear of liability may lead to additional self-censorship by operators." See
Delfi o. Estonia ¶ 1 (Sajo, J. and Tsotsoria, J., dissenting). However, not all
commentators have found the decision so disturbing. See OSTER, MEDIA LAW, supra note

36, at 240-41 (arguing that the "collateral censorship" warned of in the dissenting
opinion of Judges Sajo and Tsotsoria may be overblown because the Court limited the
scope of the judgment, it did not impose an obligation on news portals to censor content
in their comment sections, and the fact that other interests and rights should be
accounted for, such as the right to reputation, which in the case of anonymous comments
can only be corralled by regulating "those who control the code.").
130. In this case, a nonprofit self-regulatory organization of Internet content
providers (MTE) and an Internet news portal (Index.hu) were held liable by Hungarian
courts for offensive comments posted on their websites by users. See generally MTE v.
Hungary, supra note 124.
131. See generally id.
132. See id. T¶ 71-88.
133. See id. ¶¶ 64, 70, 91.
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230 of the Communications Decency Act details that "[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider," and as such, they are protected from the
possibility of liability for this content. 135 Furthermore, intermediaries
will not be liable for "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user

considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected." 136 This stands in stark contrast to the
European framework discussed in the previous section, where an
intermediary may become a content provider through the exercise of

editorial control, thus exposing themselves to more liability.1 37 Matters
concerning intellectual property in the United States are governed by
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the provisions of which are more
similar to the limited liability provisions for host providers in the ECommerce Directive. 1 38 This "safe harbor" provision protects hosting
intermediaries from liability, so long as they were not .aware of an
infringement, or once they became aware or were notified by a third

party, they "expeditiously" took down or disabled access to the
infringing content; further, the intermediary may not financially
benefit from the infringing activity directly. 139 A number of countries

134. Cf. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 98, art. 14 (stating that the hosting
provider will not be liable if they do not have actual knowledge of the illegal content, or
once they do have actual knowledge, they act quickly to remove access to the content).
135. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, §
230(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 138 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018)). Notably, this
limited liability provision does not apply to matters that concern intellectual property
law. Interestingly, the U.S. has been exporting this exception through free trade
agreements with other countries including Chile, Colombia, and Morocco. See GARROTE
FERNANDEZ-DfEZ, supra note 95, §§ V, XI, XII.
136. Communications Decency Act sec. 509, § 230(c)(2)(a); see also Langdon v.
Google, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007). Google and Microsoft argued that
their exercise of editorial discretion in filtering and deleting content from their services
is protected by this provision. One might argue that this appears to leave the door wide
open for private censorship with little to no transparency and often no appeal process;
for instance, this enables Facebook to block constitutionally-protected speech such as
nude pictures for merely violating Facebook's terms of service. On the other hand, it

encourages self-regulation. See id.
137. See Case C-291/13, Sotiris Papasavvas v. O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia,
Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2209, 11 Sept. 2014. Regarding a newspaper that operated a free
online version of its articles, the CJEU found that because the newspaper had, in
principle, knowledge about the information it posted and exercised control over that
information, it could not be considered an intermediary within the understanding of
Articles 12 to 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. See also E-Commerce Directive, supra
note 98, and discussion on content providers versus intermediaries, Part II .1.
138. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, sec. 202, § 512(c)(1),
112 Stat. 2860, 2879-80 (1998).
139. See id.
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in Latin America have begun implementing similar frameworks, as the

United

States

has

been

"exporting"

it

through

free

trade

40

agreements.
Obviously, however, there are still other jurisdictions with
different systems in place. Brazil has a system most similar to that
14
posed in the Declaration quoted at the beginning of the section. 1
Brazil's Law no. 12.965/2014 (also known as the "Brazilian Internet
Bill of Rights") provides that Internet application providers should only
be held liable if they fail to comply with a judicial order to disable

access to the identified content.14 2 At the other end of the spectrum lies
China, which has in the past used a strict liability regime for
intermediaries, although it should be noted that its framework has
been undergoing change so as to make it more similar to systems found
abroad.' 43

140.

See J. Carlos Lara Gklvez & Alan M. Sears, The Impact of Free Trade

Agreements on Internet Intermediary Liability in Latin America, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 172-73 (Oxford University Press, 2020).

141. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
142. See Presidencia da Repdblica, Lei No. 12.965, 23 de Abril de 2014 (Braz.).
Article 19 states that "[i]n order to ensure freedom of expression and to prevent
censorship, internet application providers may only be held civilly liable for damage
resulting from content generated by third parties if after specific judicial order the
provider fails to take action to make the content identified as offensive unavailable on
its service by the stipulated deadline, subject to the technical limitations of its service
and any legal provisions to the contrary." It further states: "§ 1" The judicial order
mentioned in the heading must contain, under the penalty of nullification, clear and
specific identification of the content claimed to be a violation, which allows for the
unequivocal identification of the content. § 20 In cases where there is an infringement on
copyright laws and other related rights, this Article shall be applicable when specific
legal precaution has been utilized, with full respect for freedom of expression and other
guarantees provided for in Art. 5 of the Federal Constitution." Requiring judicial orders
can be viewed as more protective of freedom of expression as intermediaries will not err
on the side of caution and take down content merely upon receiving notification of
allegedly infringing content by a private party. On the other hand, the person or entity
may suffer more damage by having the infringing content remain online until a court
order is issued. This issue is addressed to an extent by Article 21, which establishes
subsidiary liability for intermediaries that are disseminating private content (which may
be images, videos or other material containing nudity or sexual acts) created by a third
party; upon notification by the participant or legal representative, the intermediary must
stop promotion, in a diligent manner, and within the scope and technical limits of the
service, make said content unavailable. See id. arts. 19, 21.
143. See Qian Tao, Legal framework of online intermediaries'liabilityin China, 14
DIGITAL POL'Y REG. GOvERNANCE 59, 61-62, 68 (2012); E-Commerce Law of the People's
Republic of China (adopted Aug. 31, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019), art. 38,
[https://perma.cc/5R53-NU3F]
https://npcobserver.com/lawlist/e-commerce-law/
(archived Aug. 21, 2020).

2020]

ALGORITHMIC SPEECHAND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

1359

c. Limited Liability Generally
At the risk of drawing too broad of generalizations from these

disparate systems, generally, two conditions must be considered when
an intermediary claims a limited liability defense: the intermediary's

knowledge of the infringement, and the intermediary's response to a
takedown notice of the claimed infringement. 144

Where then does this leave the creators or controllers of the
algorithms used in search engines' autocomplete functions or in the
search engine results themselves?
Regarding the autocomplete functions, the general trend is that
search engines may not invoke the limited liability defense in the first
place; granted, there is still no consensus on this point.1 45 On its face,

the inability to invoke the defense appears to be a reasonable approach.
While this form of algorithm may not fall neatly into either content
provider or intermediary categories, the autocomplete suggestions

appear to be performing a function that is beyond that of a mere
intermediary, and, in the end, the search engine has (editorial) control

over the output as it has the capability to filter out certain results.
On the other hand, with search engine results, the proprietors are
generally able to make use of limited liability defenses, assuming they

respond to notifications of infringing content within a reasonable
time.1 46
There are also practical aspects that should be considered as well.
Holding search engines liable for search results may lead to an

unviable business model. Web search has become such an integral part
of the Internet experience that it is difficult to imagine how one would
find information online without the use of search engines, and the right
to receive information would no doubt be implicated. Hence, the
limitation of liability appears warranted.

However, autocomplete suggestions in their current state are not
nearly as integral as search engine results are, and may be viewed as
merely a convenience. Perhaps a taming of the feature is warranted, or
maybe the benefits of even more easily accessible information outweigh

the detriments so as to influence legislators to extend limited liability

144. There is arguably a third condition that must be considered: the intermediary's
possible financial benefit from the relevant activity. However, there is no consensus in

Europe on this point. See Delfi AS v. Estonia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 64569/09, ¶¶ 11213 (2015).
145.

See supra text accompanying notes 114-20.

146. What is a reasonable time will depend on the jurisdiction, and perhaps the
nature of the infringing content, as seen above. See, e.g., Carolyn S. Toto and Kimberly
Buffington, The Complicated Relationship between DMCA Takedown Notices and the
Word "Expeditious," INTERNET & Soc. MEDIA LAw BLoG (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://www.internetandtechnologylaw.com/the-complicated-relationship-between-

dmca-takedown-notices-and-the-word-expeditious/
[https://perma.cc/Z9HP-2N44
(archived Sept. 21, 2020) ("For now, the relevant cases suggest that while responding
within days or even weeks may be expeditious, taking months to respond is not.").
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when the

47
autocomplete function is essentially a reflection of others' searches.'

Further regulation or guidance is clearly needed in this arena in
order to clarify and harmonize the existing standards. The Internet,
and the technology underpinning it, such as algorithms, has evolved in
such a way so as to render many of the currently relevant provisions

problematic to apply. Furthermore, algorithms and their speech
outputs will only increase in complexity with time. The difficulty will
no doubt lie in making the definitions and provisions technologically

neutral so as to be able to adapt to changing technologies, while still
being specific enough so as to be interpretable by courts when
presented with unforeseen cases.

III. TO WHAT EXTENT IS ALGORITHMIC SPEECH WORTHY OF
PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION?

Given the foregoing discussion, the next question becomes: To
what extent is algorithmic speech worthy of protection under
international freedom of expression standards? Broadly, the following
sections will examine to what extent interferences with algorithmic
speech may be justified. First, possible interferences with algorithmic

speech will be discussed.
A. Interferences with Algorithmic Speech
Interferences with or limitations on freedom of expression may be
found, inter alia, through legislation, administrative regulations, or
judicial decisions, which can prohibit or impose civil or criminal
148
liability for a publication.

147. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 on attribution.
148. See Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which refers
to different aspects that can constitute interference, such as "formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties." ECHR, supra note 31, art. 10(2). It should also be noted that
an interference with or limitation on freedom of expression does not mean that there has

been a violation, and is often not a point of contention between the parties.
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International courts have found interferences with freedom of
expression in a wide variety of instances, such as through:
"
"

an injunction preventing publication, 149
a fine on a company for a user expressing hate speech or
incitement to violence on a website,1 50

"

a criminal conviction and sentence for disseminating hate
speech, 151
an order to disclose a source with a fine for refusing to do so,1 52

"

"

a criminal conviction and fine for defaming a religious group,15 3
a criminal penalty for genocide denial,1 54
a criminal conviction for publishing classified material,1 55 the
denial of a court to release a complaint pending before it,1 56
restricting the discussion of certain topics by the media,1 5 7

"

the overbroad blocking of websites,1 5 8

"

the prohibition on publishing taxation data by a data
protection agency,1 59 a statutory prohibition of paid political
advertising on radio and television,1 60
denying a license to a television broadcasting company that is
critical of the government,161 and additional liability for
publishing something online in addition to print.162

"
"
"

"

149. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6538/74, ¶
49 (1979).
150. See Delfi AS v. Estonia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 64569/09, ¶ 118 (2015). In this
case an interference was found with the applicant news portal's freedom of expression

even though they were being fined for a comment posted by one of its readers. See id.
151. Jersild v. Denmark, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 15890/89, ¶ 27 (1994).
152. Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 17488/90, ¶ 28 (1996).
153. Giniewski v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 64015/00, ¶ 9 (2006).
154. See Perineek v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 27510/08, $ 49 (2015).
155. Stoll v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 69698/01, ¶ 15 (2007).
156. Tdrsasig A Szabadsdgjogokert v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 37374/05
¶ 15 (2009).
157. Manole v. Moldova, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 13936/02, ¶ 33 (2009).
158. Yildirim v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 3111/10, ¶ 55 (2012). In this case,
the applicant operated a blog on Google Sites, the entirety of which had been blocked due
to an order of a court in a case that did not concern the applicant in any way. See id.
159. See Satakunnan Markkinapdrssi Oy v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
931/13, ¶ 122 (2015).
160. Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
48876/08, 1 78 (2013).
161. See Granier (Radio Caracas Television) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 293, ¶ 199
(June 22, 2015).
162. Times Newspapers Ltd. v. United Kingdom (Nos. 1 & 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
Nos. 3002/03 & 23676/03, ¶ 37 (2009). Having a new cause of action accrue every time
defamatory material is accessed was known as the "Internet publication rule" in the
U.K.; this can be contrasted with the "single publication rule" found in the U.S., which
stipulates that the limitation period runs from when content is first published, whether
in print or online. Id. IT 13, 24-25. It should be noted that the U.K. enacted a version of
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Some of these examples would not currently apply to algorithmic

speech, such as those pertaining to licensing or orders to disclose a
source with a fine for refusing to do so. However, without legislation
that specifically affects algorithms-whether directly or indirectly-

interferences with freedom of expression that is exercised through
algorithmic speech would largely operate no differently than they
currently do

when

the

means

is

more

ordinary.1 6 3 Thus,

an

interference with speech emanating from an algorithm could be found
primarily through ex post measures such as when civil or criminal
penalties for defamation, hate speech, or incitement to violence are

imposed on the person or entity in control of the algorithm (i.e., the
64
content provider or publisher).1

Ex ante measures could also feasibly interfere with algorithmic
speech, although due to their intrusiveness they are typically less
preferable to ex post measures. 16 5 With the recent push for algorithmic
accountability,1 66 there is an increasing possibility that regulations
will require algorithmic audits or transparency obligations,

16 7

and the

the single publication rule in section 8 of its Defamation Act. See Defamation Act 2013,
c. 26, § 5(3) (U.K.).
163. By ordinary means, I mean to say through speech that is spoken or written
by a person or entity, whether in print or online.

164.

See supra Part II.B.2 for a more thorough discussion on liability.

165.

See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 144.

166. See Bryce W. Goodman, A Step Towards Accountable Algorithms?:
Algorithmic Discrimination and the European Union General Data Protection 1-7 (2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the extent to which the
General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR] requires in regards to algorithmic audits,
and what they might look like); Margot E. Kaminski & Gianclaudio Malgieri, MultiLayered Explanations from Algorithmic Impact Assessments in the GDPR, in
PROCEEDINGS OF ACM FAT* CONFERENCE (FAT* 2020) 68, 68-77 (2020) (examining how
individual rights and systemic governance in the GDPR may allow for algorithms that
are more accountable and explainable); Algorithmic Accountability and Transparency in
the Digital Single Market: Video of European Parliament Hearing, MARIETJE SCHAAKE
https://marietjeschaake.eu/en/algorithmic-accountability-and2016),
10,
(Nov.
(archived
[https://perma.cc/8NXY-LMTX]
transparency-in-the-digital-single-market
July 11, 2020); Hemant Taneja, The Need for Algorithmic Accountability, TECHCRUNCH
https://techerunch.com/2016/09/08/the-need-for-algorithmic2016),
8,
(Sept.
accountability/ [https://perma.cc/QQ4B-4T4Q] (archived July 11, 2020) (arguing for the
self-regulation of algorithms through the use of open and transparent algorithmic
watchdogs). The new General Data Protection Regulation has also given a nod to
algorithmic discrimination in Recital 71, which states a requirement to "implement
technical and organizational measures" that "prevent, inter alia, discriminatory effects
on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or
beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation, or that
result in measures having such an effect." Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119)
14 [hereinafter GDPR].
EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERv., A GOVERNANCE
e.g.,
167. See,
FRAMEWORK FOR ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 3 (2019);

Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019).
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required changes that may result from such audits could interfere with
the algorithmic controller's freedom of expression. However, many
questions remain as to how such a system would be implemented, and
thus it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore in depth or

hypothesize as to how algorithmic speech may be interfered with in the
future through such regulations. 168
The following subparts will examine how an international court

might analyze an interference with freedom of expression, where the
speech involved is the output of algorithms, in order to determine
whether there has been a violation.
B. Under What Circumstances Would Interferences with Algorithmic

Speech be Justified?
For an interference with a fundamental right-such as freedom of
expression-to be permissible, it must meet the requirements of the
three-part test: the restriction must be prescribed by law, pursue a
legitimate aim, and be necessary in pursuit of that aim. 169 The
interfering state bears the burden to show that the limitation is

justified. 170
This justification standard is well recognized around the world.
Both Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union and Article 10 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
include slightly different formulations of the three-part test, 171 and the

.

168. See Goodman, supra note 166, at 6 (observing a number of outstanding
questions such as who will be responsible for performing the audits, who will bear the
cost of the audits, and how much will companies be expected to assist with the audits).
169. This test is the same in relation to freedom of expression on the Internet,
where it has been stated that "any restriction that can affect this right must be provided
for by law in the clearest and most precise terms possible, pursue a legitimate aim
recognized by international law, and be necessary to accomplish that objective...
Catalina Botero Marino (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression), Freedom of
Expression and the Internet, ¶ 122, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.11/13
(Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Botero Marino, Freedom of Expression and the Internet].
170. See, e.g., U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, The Siracusa Principles on the
Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, annex, at 3 (1984) [hereinafter Siracusa
Principles]; Human Rights

Comm'n,

Coleman v.

Australia,

Communication

No.

1157/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1157/2003, ¶ 7.3 (2005); Catalina Botero Marino
(Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression), Inter-American Legal Framework
Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, ¶ 83, O.A.S. Doc. CIDH/RELE/INF.2/09
(Dec. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Botero Marino, Inter-American Legal Framework].
171. Article 52(1) of the CFREU states:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

CFREU, supra note 33, art. 52.
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European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly recognized this
73
standard,1 72 as has the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.1
Additionally, limitations on freedom of expression are to be interpreted

strictly.1 74
Despite the fact that these standards are well established, when
examining algorithmic speech, we are in largely uncharted territory.
The following subparts will therefore analyze interferences with

various forms of algorithmic speech within the three-part test.
1. Prescribed by Law

Any restriction on freedom of expression,

and by extension

algorithmic speech, must be prescribed by law. First, this entails that

the law that limits expression is accessible and foreseeable, the latter
of which means that it must be sufficiently precise to allow persons to
anticipate the consequences of their actions.1 75 Even vaguely worded
laws can pass this test,1 76 although the degree of foreseeability will
77
depend on a number of factors.1

Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR states:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
ECHR, supra note 31, art. 10.
172. See e.g., Muller v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 10737/84, ¶¶ 29-31
(1988); Aleksey Ovchinnikov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 24061/04, ¶ 44 (2010).
173. See, e.g., Us6n Ramirez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, 1 88 (Nov. 20,
2009); Kimel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 177, ¶ 58 (May 2, 2008); Canese v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, ¶ 96 (Aug. 31, 2004); Herrera-Ulloa
v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, T¶ 120-23 (July 2, 2004).
174. See EUR. CT. OF HUM. RIGHTS RESEARcH Div., INTERNET: CASE-LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (2015).

175. See Human Rights Comm'n, General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011); Sanoma
Uitgevers BV v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 38224/03, ¶ 81 (2010); Us6n
Ramirez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, ¶ 55 (Nov. 20, 2009); Cirio v. Uruguay,
Case 11.500, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 124/06, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev.
1 ¶ 64 (2006); Botero Marino, Inter-American Legal Framework, supra note 170, ¶ 69.
176. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6538/74,
1 49 (1979).
177. See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 113 ("The degree of
foreseeability depends on the content of the law, its area of application, and the number
and status of those to whom it is addressed."); see also Cantoni v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 17862/91, ¶ 35 (1996).
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Second, the law must legally protect persons against arbitrary
interferences by public authorities. The delineation of the scope of
those authorities' powers in applying the law must be sufficiently clear,
and those authorities must not be given carte blanche. 178 Third, the
law must meet certain formal requirements, such as being enshrined
in a statute or a binding judicial decision. 179 This also entails that the
law must be duly enacted in accordance with proper legislative
procedure. 180 Finally, criminal sanctions must meet the principle of
strict legality according to Article 15 of the ICCPR, Article 7 of the

ECHR, and Article 9 of the ACHR. 181
The currently existing laws that may affect algorithmic speech,

such as those that pertain to defamation, hate speech, or copyright,
etc., are unlikely to run afoul of this portion of the three-part test, as
many of the more contentious ones have been tested through judicial
scrutiny in contexts that do not involve the use of algorithms. However,
with recent pushes for algorithmic accountability mentioned above,

new laws may be enacted that specifically target algorithms. 182
2. Pursuit of a Legitimate Aim

Any interference with freedom of expression must pursue a
legitimate aim. These aims, which include respecting the rights of
others or protecting national security or public health, are stated in

Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, Article 10(2) of the ECHR, Article 13(2) of
the ACHR, and Article 52 of the CFREU.18 3 While there is some

&

178. See Human Rights Comm., Pinkney v. Canada, Communication No. 27/1978,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, at 95, ¶ 34 (1980); Human Rights Comm'n, General Comment
No. 27: Freedom of Movement (article 12), ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov.
2, 1999). See also Siracusa Principles, supra note 170, at 4; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v.
Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 38224/03, ¶ 82 (2010); Telegraaf Media Nederland
Landelijke Media BV v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 39315/06, ¶ 102 (2012);
Reyes v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 89 (Sept. 19, 2006); Botero Marino,
Inter-American Legal Framework, supra note 170, ¶ 70.
179. See Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 38224/03,
¶ 83 (2010); Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 18139/91, ¶ 37
(1995); X., Ltd. & Y. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Comm'n H.R. App. No. 8710/79, ¶ 7 (1982);
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6538/74, ¶ 49 (1979).
180. See Barthold v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8734/79, ¶ 48 (1985); The
Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6, ¶ 22-24 (May 9, 1986).
181. See Khodorkovskiy & Lebedev v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. Nos. 11082/06
13772/05, ¶ 778-85 (2013); Us6n Ramirez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, ¶ 55 (Nov. 20,
2009); Botero Marino, Inter-American Legal Framework, supra note 170, ¶ 72.
182. See supra note 166.
183. For example, Article 13(2) of the ACHR states:
The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not
be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of
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variation between the aims listed-in particular with the provision in
184
the ECHR-they are functionally the same.

Generally, these listed aims are exclusionary;

185

however, certain

ideas have crept in, such as media pluralism, and others have been
expanded upon through courts' jurisprudence, such as the "rights of
others." 186 Courts review the claimed legitimate aims with strict
scrutiny, and thus there is no margin of appreciation given by courts
to impugned states regarding this prong.
Similar to the previous section, unless there are unforeseen
developments, it is unlikely for there to be any issues with

interferences to algorithmic speech based upon the state not pursuing
a legitimate aim in that interference. Restrictions on speech through

laws on defamation, hate speech, or copyright are without doubt

87
As
pursuing a legitimate aim as the framework currently stands.1

will be seen in the following Parts, the questions posed may not be so
easily dismissed and will require more analysis than these two

elements just discussed.

liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to
ensure:

a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals.

ACHR, supra note 32, art. 13(2). The equivalent provisions in the other documents
are very similar. A basic understanding of what these different terms mean may be found
in the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant and Political Rights. See Siracusa Principles, supra note 170, at
4-6.
184.

See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 115.

185. See Human Rights Comm'n, General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
186. See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 115.
187. See Jersild v. Denmark, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 15890/89, 1 27 (1994).
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3. Necessary in Pursuit of that Aim
Finally, any interference with freedom of expression must be
necessary in pursuit of the legitimate aim in order to be justified. 188

This prong of the three-part test, which is also known as the principle
of proportionality, is comprised of three elements itself: suitability,
necessity, and proportionality sensu stricto (proportionality in the
narrow sense). 189
Furthermore, and in contrast to the "pursuit of a legitimate aim"
prong, states are afforded a margin of appreciation by courts that are

reviewing interferences with freedom of expression. 190 This is because
international courts are not intended to take the place of their national
counterparts, but to review the decisions under the relevant human
rights instrument.191 A margin of appreciation is applicable to all of
the three steps that comprise the proportionality prong, albeit in

different respects.1 92 As the first two steps-suitability and necessityrefer to factual matters, the margin of appreciation is for the empirical
uncertainties of the reviewing court, whereas proportionality sensu
stricto concerns a normative analysis, and thus the margin of
appreciation addresses the court's normative uncertainties, such as
those regarding the morals or religion of the local people. 193

Suitability refers to the examination of whether the interference

was in fact appropriate to achieve the legitimate aim.1 94 In other

188. See Novaya Gazeta & Borodyanskiy v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
14087/08, ¶ 32 (2013); Canese v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, ¶ 95 (Aug. 31, 2004); Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 107, ¶ 120 (July 2, 2004); see generally U. N., Econ. & Soc. Council, The
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, annex (Sept. 28, 1984).
189. See Human Rights Comm., Ballantyne v. Canada, Communication No. 359,
385/89, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1, ¶ 11.4 (1993); Cirio v.
Uruguay, Merits, Case 11.500, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 124/06,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 1 65 (2006); Canese v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, ¶ 96 (Aug. 31, 2004); Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6538/74, ¶ 62 (1979); Botero
Marino, Inter-American Legal Framework, supra note 170, ¶¶ 85-88.
190.

See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 118.

191. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 5493/72, ¶ 50
(1976); Sunday Times, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6538/74, ¶ 59. See also Article 2 of the
Optional First Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 46(1)(a) of the ACHR, and Article 35(1) of
the ECHR, which stipulate that domestic remedies must be exhausted before taking the
case to an international court. ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 2; ACHR, supra note 32, art.
46(1)(a); ECHR, supra note 31, art. 35(1).
192. See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 118.
193. See id. at 119-20.
194. See Botero Marino, Inter-AmericanLegal Framework, supra note 170, 1¶ 8588; Kimel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 177, ¶¶ 68-71 (May 2, 2008); OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 124.
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words, the interference must be effectively conducive to attaining the
195
objective in question.
The second step, necessity, involves the determination of whether

the interference used was the least intrusive measure among those
196
within the European and
which could achieve the legitimate aim;
Inter-American human rights systems, this is also known as "pressing

social need." 197 Where the analysis of the pursuit of a legitimate aim

98
The
looks towards the "end," this test focuses on the "means."1
at
important
margin of appreciation given by the court is particularly

this stage as it affects the level of scrutiny applied when examining the
99
In regard to
measure that was the cause of the interference.1
algorithmic speech, this necessity test could definitely become a point
of contention, especially if an invasive form of algorithmic auditing was

implemented through regulation, for example.
Finally, proportionality sensu stricto refers to the analysis of
whether the interference was strictly proportionate in relation to the
legitimate aim that is pursued.200 It is essentially a balancing exercise,

where in the present instance, freedom of expression must be weighed
20
against the advantages of the interference. 1 The nature and severity
of the interference is examined, as well as the importance of the
competing rights or interests and the extent to which they are
affected.2 0 2 In general, the various human rights are deserving of equal
respect.2 o
Unlike the previous two prongs of the three-part test that were
examined, the "necessary in pursuit of the legitimate aim" (or
proportionality) prong is more likely to be the subject of contention. In
the following Parts, other rights and interests that might be implicated
with algorithmic speech and its interference will be examined, and
problems that international adjudicators may have when reviewing

cases that involve algorithmic speech will be anticipated and analyzed.

195.

See Botero Marino, Inter-American Legal Framework, supra note 170, ¶¶ 85-

196.

See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 124-25.

88.
197. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 5493/72, ¶ 49
(1976); Fontevecchia and D'Amico v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 238, ¶ 54 (Nov. 29, 2011).
198.

See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 124-25.

199. See id.
200. See id. at 125. See also Botero Marino, Freedom of Expression and the
Internet, supra note 170, ¶ 124.
201.

See OSTER, MEDIA FREEDOM, supra note 36, at 125.

202. See id.
203. See Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 1), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 39954/08, ¶
87 (2012); Delfi AS v. Estonia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 64569/09, ¶ 118 (2015). But see
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD),
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 81 (May 13, 2014).
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a. Other Rights and Interests at Play
As just described, the court must take into account a number of
rights and interests when there has been an interference with the right
to freedom of expression. Regarding algorithmic speech in particular,
there are several interests that might be relevant when analyzing
whether there has been a violation of the right. It must be noted that
some rights and interests may be relevant to certain forms of
algorithmic speech and not others. In addition to the nature of the

algorithm, the factual scenario, including the nature of the
interference, will also dictate which interests are relevant.
With freedom of expression, there is both the right to impart
information, as well as the right to receive information. 204 When there
has been an interference with algorithmic speech, the right to receive
information on the part of the user may also be implicated. 205 While
this may not apply to the likes of more purely "social" interactions with
Microsoft Tay, it would likely apply to search engine results, the
algorithms that power more informational chat bots like Amazon's
Alexa, Apple's Siri, Google's Assistant, or Microsoft's Cortana, and to a
lesser extent a search engine's autocomplete suggestions.

206

If the interference is such that it imposes onerous obligations on
the controller of the algorithm, and thus makes the business model
difficult to sustain, the freedom to conduct a business might be
impeded. 20 7 Such obligations could occur through requirements to
filter or monitor the output of the algorithm, or through requirements

for algorithmic transparency and audits. This could potentially apply
to most of the forms of algorithmic speech discussed above, such as
search engine results and their autocomplete function as well as more
advanced chat bots, but would be less likely to apply to news-producing
algorithms or simple chat bots with standardized scripts or outputs.

However, if there were a system in place that required algorithmic

204. Times Newspapers, Ltd. v. United Kingdom (Nos. 1 & 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
Nos. 3002/03 & 23676/03, 1 27 (2009); Guerra v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14967/89,
¶ 53 (1998); Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 13778/88, ¶ 63
(1992); Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 13585/88, ¶ 59
(1991).
205. See Tarsasig A Szabadsigjogokert v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
37374/05, 1¶ 35-36 (2009).
206. BGH, May 14, 2013, VI ZR 269/12, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=64163&pos=0&anz=1
[https://perma.cc/KQW5-2SPP] (archived July 11, 2020) (finding that there is no general
obligation for the search engine to seek out possible infringements of the autocomplete
algorithm).
207. See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, 11 4749; Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶1 44-47 (Feb. 16, 2012).
Although the context of these two cases were slightly different, in both of them it was
found that an obligation to install and maintain a filtering system did not strike a fair
balance between the protection of the intellectual property right of copyright holders and
the freedom to conduct a business.

1370

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:1327

transparency in a form that did not sufficiently occlude the source code
or underlying algorithm, and it were to leak, the competitive advantage
gained through the use of that algorithm or code may invoke the

freedom to conduct a business for a broader array of algorithms that
produce speech.
A person's right to privacy or right to data protection may be
infringed if the algorithmic output contains the data sensitive to one's
209
but
private life. 208 This is particularly relevant for search engines,

it may also become relevant for a search engine's autocomplete
function or for informational chat bots.
Intellectual property rights could be implicated on both sides of

the balancing equation. In the case of search engines, informational
chat bots, and perhaps even autocomplete functions, algorithmic
speech may involve the intellectual property rights of copyright holders
210
On the other hand, and
if there are links to infringing content.

related to the freedom to conduct a business mentioned above,
algorithmic transparency could be implemented in such a way so as to
breach the intellectual property rights of the creator or controller of the
algorithm in the algorithm itself.

The application of the above rights and interests will no doubt
depend on the factual scenario of the case at hand. As algorithmic
speech, interferences, and other facts of a case may all vary widely, it
is a bit difficult at this point in time to hypothesize how algorithmic

speech may be interfered with and impacted. However, given the fact
that the balancing exercise may take into consideration multiple rights
and interests on both sides of the scale, it is particularly flexible in
handling a wide range of situations.
b. Issues Going Forward

There are numerous issues that may affect or influence the
foregoing analysis in the future. Many of these involve questions of

policy and societal values that accompany granting algorithmic speech
protection.

208. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Protecci6n de
Datos (AEPD), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 81 (May 13, 2014). While this case was decided
within the context of the CFREU, Article 12 of the UDHR, Article 17 of the ICCPR,
Article 8 of the ECHR, and Article 11 of the ACHR contain similar principles. Further,
the principle underlying the case, that of the 'right to be forgotten' or 'right to de-list', is
having a global effect with countries around the globe considering legislation that would
enshrine the right.
209. See id.
210. See Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, ¶ 55 (Sept. 8, 2016); Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 44-47 (Feb. 16, 2012); Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v.
SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, ¶¶ 47-49.
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The aforementioned potential for more stringent algorithmic
accountability mechanisms will likely be one such issue that will
heavily affect how algorithmic speech is viewed by courts. If the form
of algorithmic accountability is such that it heavily interferes with the
operations of the creator or controller of the algorithm, such as through
the use of periodic and invasive audits, it could be prohibitively
expensive and impede innovation. Nonetheless, this may be an
adequate trade off-from a societal standpoint-in order to protect
users from hate speech and discrimination. 2 11 However, such an
intrusive framework for accountability is unlikely to happen in the

near term, as the industry will likely push for self-regulation to the
extent possible, 2 12 and current measures-such as the GDPR-do not
currently prescribe anything quite so extreme. 213

Courts and legislators may also have to take into account the
nature and importance of the service that is making use of the
algorithm. Certain services may be worthy of carving out protections
to protect them from liability so that they remain viable. Search
engines are extremely important to the modern usage of the web and
will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.21 4 While perhaps not
rising to the level of search engines, other forms of algorithmic speech
also may provide substantial value to society. For example,
algorithmically generated news stories may free up resources for
newspapers to focus on topics that require more investigation, thus
enabling better information dispersion to the public, and some chat
bots can potentially save businesses money by partially automating
support services.

Further, decisions taken by legislators and courts can have large
and wide-ranging effects given the fact that the law surrounding this
area is currently poorly defined. Without care, a decision directed

211. Discrimination is outside the scope of this article, but it is particularly
relevant in the realm of algorithmic biases, especially those concerning loans and credit
scores.

212. Sandra Wachter has stated that "'[t]he industry fear is that [companies] will
have to disclose their code[.]' Louise Matsakis, What Does a Fair Algorithm Actually
Look Like?, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/what-does-a-fairalgorithm-look-like/ [https://perma.cc/2DQX-RWDU] (archived July 11, 2020) (alteration
in original).
213. To combat algorithmic discrimination, the GDPR encompasses two forms of
algorithmic accountability: data sanitization (Articles 9 and 22(2)), or "the removal of
special categories from datasets used in automated decision making", and algorithmic
transparency (Articles 12, 13(2)(f), and 14(2)(g)), or the "right to explanation" which
includes "'meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance
and the envisaged consequences' when automated decision making or profiling takes
place." Goodman, supra note 166, at 2. Impact assessments (Article 35) have also been
discussed as a means of implementing algorithmic accountability. Kaminski & Malgieri,
supra note 166, at 68.
214. If it were to be replaced, it would likely be with another form of algorithm;
perhaps users will increasingly shift towards informational chat bots with voice support,
for instance.
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towards Microsoft Tay, which has comparatively little value to society,
will also likely affect chat bots providing customer service or
informational chat bots like Google's Assistant and Apple's Siri. This
can in turn have an effect on these important informational services,

as they may "censor" themselves-or rather reduce the quality or
accuracy of the information provided-in order to escape potential
future liability.
Additionally, certain forms of algorithms that lie on the fringe of
speech may present difficult situations for courts. For example,

Facebook uses algorithms to curate news stories (as well as cat videos)
that a user's friends post, a number of which are then displayed in the

user's "feed." Does this constitute a form of speech? At first glance, it
may appear clear that it does not. But what if the curation of new
stories displayed to users is such that it favors one side, so as to push
a certain viewpoint or create a filter bubble-perhaps to keep users
engaged--could it then be said to be Facebook's speech? 215 After all,
216
It is, however, a
this could be seen as a form of editorial control.
private company, which may have its own opinion, and the profit
motive is a strong incentive to keep its algorithms content-neutral so
as to not disenfranchise users who may not share the same opinion. On

the other hand, with an ever-increasing number of users, perhaps one
day there may be a need for a reimagining of what constitutes a public
21 7
space for speech.

Finally, from a broad perspective, there are benefits to protecting
algorithmic speech,

in addition to the services

algorithms themselves.

Perhaps most

provided by the

importantly, it protects

innovation. If the creators or controllers of algorithms were held

strictly liable for every offense committed by those algorithms, it may
become unfeasible to continue creating or operating new algorithms,
and the public would no longer be able to benefit from these creations.
Additionally, this would disproportionately affect small companies and
startups, which may not have the resources to pay fines or fight battles

in court. By contrast, the risks are relatively small. People might be
defamed or subject to harmful speech by interacting with algorithms

218
However, the
that have not undergone a sufficient vetting process.
legal framework for dealing with such speech should be able to

215. See Aarti Shahani, From Hate Speech to Fake News: The Content Crisis
17,
2016),
NPR
(Nov.
Mark
Zuckerberg,
Facing
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/11/17/495827410/from-hate-speechto-fake-news-the-content-crisis-facing-mark-zuckerberg [https://perma.c[HMB6-Y62U]
(archived July 11, 2020).
216. See supra Part II.B.1.
217. See Josh Constine, Facebook Now Has 2 Billion Monthly Users... and
2017),
27,
(June
TECHCRUNCH
Responsibility,
[https://perma.cc/RUM5https://techerunch.com/2017/06/27/facebook-2-billion-users/
4ZE4] (archived July 11, 2020).
218. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Microsoft Tay and attribution).
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adequately address harmful algorithmic outputs as well as it does for
person-to-person interactions for the time being, especially if relatively
minor adjustments are made. 21 9
As algorithms increase in complexity, so too will the issues they
present. While the current framework for freedom of expression is

largely sufficient to be able to handle the problems of today, only time
will tell whether it will be able to adequately adapt to the intricacies of
the future.220

IV. CONCLUSION

As algorithms have become increasingly common, so have
algorithms that approximate speech. Given this development, this
Article analyzed various forms of algorithmic speech within the
international freedom of expression framework. This Article focused on

the algorithms that would fall within three categories, defined as such:
curated production (e.g., news stories, search engine results),
interactive/responsive production (e.g., simple chat bots), and semi-

autonomous

production

(e.g.,

Microsoft's

Tay,

search

engine's

autocomplete function).
One of the first issues examined was to whom algorithmic speech

should be attributed and whether the creators or controllers should be
considered content providers or mere intermediaries, which ultimately
has implications for liability. This determination turns on a number of
factors, such as whether the algorithm is providing its own contentor adopting it as its own-and editorial control. While the
determination may seem relatively straightforward, and it is in some

cases, certain forms of algorithmic speech present problems. For
instance, with the curated production of news stories, editorial control

is no doubt exercised, and thus the controller of the algorithm would
be a publisher. On the other hand, adaptive chat bots like Microsoft
Tay and a search engine's autocomplete function both use the input of

other users when formulating responses and suggestions, respectively.
As such, they could be considered the speech of other users, rather than
that

219.

of

the

creator

or

controller

of

the

algorithm.

For

In certain instances, it may even be superior due to the 'data trail'left behind.

Furthermore, people can oftentimes be erratic or unpredictable and not abide by requests

to stop communication. At least with algorithms, if they start to malfunction, one can
avoid interacting with it in most instances and it will likely be taken offline quickly in
order to avoid potential liability-or loss of reputation-as in the case of Microsoft Tay.
220. Indeed, if fully autonomous artificial intelligence is realized, fairly significant
changes may have to be made to the current framework. Some authors have already
proposed frameworks and rough timelines for rolling out the attribution of personhood
to nonhuman computer agents. See, e.g., Bert-Japp Koops, Mireille Hildebrandt & DavidOliver Jaquet-Chiffelle, Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the
Information Society?, 11 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 497 (2010).
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interactive/responsive production such as these, even though there is
user input, the output could very well be viewed as adopting user input

under the "ordinaryreasonable person" standard; hence the controllers
lean towards being considered content providers. In the end, the

creator or controller of the algorithm has final control over the output
in most cases, and could thus be said to have editorial control. On the
other hand, it is likely that an ordinary reasonable person would

consider that search engine results are lists of content that are neither
provided nor adopted by the search engine itself, as it only presents
excerpts and links to content provided elsewhere. Thus, the search
engine in this context is the most likely among the algorithms

discussed to be a mere intermediary and to avail itself of the associated
limitations of liability. More guidance from legislators and courts
would benefit this area of law, especially looking forward.
The liability of the creators or controllers of algorithmic speech
was also analyzed. As frameworks for limited liability differ around the
world, a number of them were discussed and compared, and general
principles were drawn from them. While the analysis for intermediary
liability may differ substantially depending on the court that is hearing

the case due to the scope of judicial review, very generally, two
conditions must be considered when an intermediary claims a limited

liability defense. The first is the intermediary's knowledge of the
infringement, and the second is the intermediary's response to a
takedown notice of the claimed infringement. The general trend in

Europe is for search engines to be liable for autocomplete suggestions,
which appears to be a reasonable approach. As for search engine
results, the proprietors are generally able to make use of limited
liability defenses, assuming they respond to notifications of infringing
content within a reasonable time. Further regulation or guidance was

found to be clearly needed in this area, so as to clarify and harmonize
the existing standards. The Internet, and the technology underpinning

it, such as algorithms, has evolved in such a way so as to make many
of the currently relevant provisions ambiguous or inapplicable.
Furthermore, algorithms and their speech outputs will only increase
in complexity with time.

The Article then examined the extent to which algorithmic speech
is worthy of protection under international standards of freedom of
expression. Much will depend upon forms of algorithmic accountability

that may be required in the future, as some forms could be considered
invasive and burdensome so as to interfere with freedom of expression.
Until then, if there is an interference with algorithmic speech,
potential interferences with algorithmic forms of expression will be

largely the same as they currently are for human speech, such as fines
or criminal penalties.
The next Parts go on to investigate interferences under the three-

part test. Any restriction or interference with freedom of expression
must be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary
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in pursuit of that aim. The interfering state bears the burden to show
that the limitation is justified. Being prescribed by law entails that the
law that limits expression is accessible and foreseeable, the law must
legally protect persons against arbitrary interferences by public
authorities, and the law must meet certain formal requirements. Any
interference with freedom of expression must also pursue one of the
legitimate aims delineated in human rights instruments. Without a

form of algorithmic accountability or another restriction targeting
algorithms in place, the first two prongs-prescribed by law and
pursuit of a legitimate aim-will again operate as they do for more
typical forms of speech. In other words, where existing laws on
defamation, hate speech, or copyright are used to restrict algorithmic

forms of expression, they are unlikely to be successfully challenged.
As for the necessary in pursuit of a legitimate aim prong, the focus
is on the proportionality sensu stricto step, which refers to the analysis
of whether the interference was strictly proportionate in relation to the
legitimate aim that is pursued. This involves a balancing exercise,

where in the present instance, freedom of expression must be weighed
against the advantages of the interference. The nature and severity of
the interference is examined, as well as the importance of the
competing rights or interests and the extent to which they are affected.
In addition to freedom of expression, there are a number of rights and
interests to consider when a court examines an interference with
algorithmic speech. Among these would be the right to receive
information (as the other side of the right to impart information), the
freedom to conduct a business, the right to privacy or data protection,
and the right to intellectual property. While several examples are given
as to how these rights may be implicated in relation to algorithmic
speech, ultimately whether a particular right is relevant for a court's

balancing exercise is heavily dependent on the factual scenario of the
case, as well as the type of algorithm involved.
Finally, other relevant issues surrounding algorithmic speech
were found to be important and to have an impact going forward, many

of which involve questions of policy and societal values that accompany
granting algorithmic speech protection. Among these are the actual
form of algorithmic accountability that may potentially be adopted, as
well as its intrusiveness and the resulting effects of its
implementation, the nature and importance of the service that is
making use of the algorithm, the difficulties the border cases may

bring, and the impact that protecting algorithmic speech may have on
innovation.
The primary research question for this Article was posed as
follows: To what extent is algorithmic speech protected under
international standards of freedom of expression? The answer here is
the same as it is for most legal questions: it depends. The type of
algorithm, the nature of the interference, and the factual scenarioincluding other relevant rights and interests-will affect the extent to
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which algorithmic speech is protected. While courts and legislators
may have difficulties managing issues relating to algorithmic speech,
the current framework for freedom of expression will be adequate, if

properly adapted, for some time to come.

